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I. INTRODUCTION
A United States court must refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign money
judgment “rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or
1
2
procedures.” Though few courts have ever made this finding, the systemic
inadequacy ground has nevertheless received significant attention from
1. Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1469 (2011); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and
Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of
Forum Non Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 56 KAN. L. REV. 609, 635 (2008).
2. Thomas Kelly, Note, An Unwise and Unmanageable Anachronism: Why the Time Has Come to
Eliminate Systemic Inadequacy as a Basis for Nonrecognition of Foreign Judgments, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 555,
559 (2011); Virginia A. Fitt, Note, The Tragedy of Comity: Questioning the American Treatment of Inadequate
Foreign Courts, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 1021, 1030–32 (2010); see GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 1154 (5th ed. 2011) (“In general, U.S. courts are
hesitant to deny the fairness of other countries’ judicial systems.”); Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement of
Foreign Money Judgments and the Need for Reform, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 134 (2007)
(“[T]here have been few cases denying recognition of FMJs based on the argument that the judicial system
failed to provide procedures compatible with due process.”).
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commentators who attack it for a number of doctrinal and policy reasons. One
criticism is that these state laws require courts to make foreign policy and to
3
answer political questions, thus violating the Constitution. Many courts hesitate
4
to pass judgment on the judicial system of an entire country, except for the most
politically disfavored, leading to an inconsistent patchwork of authority and a
5
lack of applicable standards. Further, the systemic inadequacy ground is
unnecessary because in almost all cases where systemic inadequacy arises, courts
6
can base nonrecognition on other, less controversial grounds. A growing number
of states are adopting the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
7
Recognition Act, which adds two grounds for dismissal based upon bias or
8
denial of due process in the original proceedings. The addition of these grounds
calls into doubt the need for inquiring into the adequacy of the entire judicial
9
system.
Several professors, practitioners, and student commentators have addressed
the doctrinal collision between forum non conveniens (FNC) and the recognition
and enforcement laws in two high-profile, multi-billion-dollar sets of toxic tort
10
litigation. The first series of cases are the DBCP pesticide cases involving
Nicaraguan plaintiffs against fruit company Dole and the chemical
manufacturers. The second group of cases are the environmental damage suits
brought by indigenous people of the Lago Agrio region of Ecuador against
11
Texaco and its parent company Chevron in Chevron Corp. v. Donziger. These
3. Montre D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1159, 1190–91, 1206 (2007).
4. Fitt, supra note 2, at 1030–32.
5. Id. at 1213-14; Kelly, supra note 22, at 570, 579-80; Fitt, supra note 2, at 1030-32; John S. Baker, Jr.
& Agustin Parise, Conflicts in International Tort Litigation Between U.S. and Latin American Courts, 42 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 18-25 (2010); Saad Gul, Old Rules for a New World? The Constitutional
Underpinnings of U.S. Foreign Judgment Enforcement Doctrine, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 67, 69-70 (2006).
6. Kelly, supra note 2, at 565, 575.
7. Karen L. Hart & Marie A. McCrary, Foreign Judgments, 80 U.S.L.W. 1682, n.5 (2012), available at
http://www.bellnunnally.com/ userfiles/files/KLH%20Getting%20Paid%20Article.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
8. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c) (7)–(8) 13 U.L.A. pt. 2
(2005) [hereinafter 2005 RECOGNITION ACT].
9. Carodine, supra note 33, at 1234–36; see infra, Part III.A (discussing the Uniform Recognition Acts).
10. See, e.g., Suraj Patel, Delayed Justice: A Case Study of Texaco and the Republic of Ecuador’s
Operations, Harms, and Possible Redress in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 71 (2012); Whytock
& Robertson, supra note 1, at 1484–92; Christina Weston, Comment, The Enforcement Loophole: JudgmentRecognition Defenses as a Loophole to Corporate Accountability for Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
731 (2011); Baker & Parise, supra note 5, passim; Cortelyou Kenney, Comment, Disaster in the Amazon:
Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights Litigation, 97 CAL. L. REV. 857, 864 (2009);
Heiser, supra note 1, passim; M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient Is
Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation? 4 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 21, 21–22 (2007).
11. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d Chevron Corp. v. Camacho
Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2012); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 303 F.3d
470 (2d Cir. 2002); see Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and
Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELY J. INT’L L. 456, passim (2010); Lucien J.
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cases were originally filed in the U.S. and were dismissed for FNC to be re-filed
abroad after a finding that the courts in plaintiffs’ home countries were adequate;
however, after plaintiffs secured money judgments in their home country,
defendants have argued U.S. courts should refuse to recognize and enforce the
12
judgments because that same foreign court system is inadequate. The different
standards at the FNC and recognition stages have created what Whytock and
Robertson characterize as an “access-to-justice gap” for the plaintiffs. This
prompted the call for a number of reforms, including that the systemic
13
inadequacy ground be applied differently, if not abolished outright.
This last concern with recognition law as applied in recent cases suggests a
theoretical approach that may yield additional perspectives: rhetoric. Mark D.
Rosen has argued that the “lack of theoretical sophistication” of the comity
doctrine, upon which recognition laws are based, prevents principled answers to
14
doctrinal questions. Rhetorical theory requires that we approach the law not in
the abstract but in the context of practice, as the interplay between litigants and
15
courts and even extending to the social and political context. And rhetorical
theory takes as its object the text, namely the judicial opinion and the legal
sources upon which it is constructed, though not as a pronouncement of the only
possible and therefore compelled result, but as a statement which justifies and
16
thereby gains adherence to its holding. Rhetoricians would look beyond the
doctrine or policy of the recognition and enforcement laws, beyond what
defendants argue, and even beyond what trial courts find, and fix their gaze upon
Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Mandatory Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign judgments for
Environmental Injury in the United States, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2009) [hereinafter “Dhooge
Mandatory”]; see also Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Discretionary Grounds for the NonRecognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241
(2010). Throughout this Article, the common names “Chevron” for Chevron Corporation and “Texaco” for
Texaco, Inc. will be used.
12. E.g., Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1449–50; Casey & Ristroph, supra note 10, at 21–22.
13. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1481; see infra discussion in Part III.B–C.
14. Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783,
856, 870 (2004).
15. See. e.g., Kirsten K. Davis, Legal Forms as Rhetorical Transaction: Competency in the Context of
Information and Efficiency, 79 UMKC L. REV. 667, 677 (2011); NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE
OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 6–7 (2005); Francis J. Mootz, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal
Practice and Theory, 491 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 491, 582 (1998); James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric,
Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 695 (1985); see Linda
Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 108, 114 (1993) (The rhetorical
conception of law “requires that texts and practices be considered in their cultural context: as purposeful
utterances and actions taken by particular individuals, directed to particular audiences.”).
16. E.g., MACCORMICK, supra note 15, passim; Mootz, supra note 15, at 568; Gerald B. Wetlaufer,
Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1561–62, 1589–90 (1990); Donald H. J.
Hermann, Legal Reasoning as Argumentation, 12 N. KY. L. REV. 467, 509 (1985); see Jeff Todd, A Rhetoric of
Warning Defects, 54 SOUTH TEX. L. REV. 343, 347 (2012) (“Rhetoric posits that meaning and power reside in
the textual relationship.”); KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES xv, xviii (1945) (claiming that his
system of dramatism is appropriate for studying “legal judgments,” and that “judicial doctrines offer the best
illustration of the concerns we place under the heading of Grammar”).
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what appellate courts say—and sometimes, on what they do not say. In both the
DBCP and Lago Agrio litigation, the Circuit Courts of Appeals have rejected the
systemic inadequacy findings made by the district courts but have avoided
17
addressing those findings.
These holdings would seem to be good news for plaintiffs with foreignmoney judgments and critics who disfavor the systemic inadequacy ground, but
from a rule of law perspective, these decisions are not good for anybody. While
18
rhetoricians reject the notion that there can be only one result in a legal dispute,
they nevertheless maintain that legal opinions must be rational and reasonable to
19
be accepted as just. When appellate courts decline to justify their holdings, or
when they ignore the established norms of appellate review (applying precedent
20
and statutory construction) their opinions are unreasonable. Because those
21
opinions become precedent, or persuasive authority themselves, the lack of a
sound basis for those decisions creates additional confusion on an issue of law
already fractured. A rhetorical reading reveals more than an “access-to-justice”
gap for plaintiffs; it demonstrates how circuit courts deny justice to all parties
and future litigants and create doubts about the integrity of the judicial system.
This Article analyzes the systemic inadequacy ground for nonrecognition in
two recent cases to demonstrate that the appellate opinions are unreasonable
because they have rejected the ground without addressing it in a rational way.
Part II summarizes the views of several rhetorical scholars about the judicial
opinion as emerging from the practice of litigation. Ultimately, opinions are
accepted as just when the decision-making process is rational and the conclusions
are supported through a careful analysis of relevant statutes and case-law—and
unacceptable when the process is irrational and the conclusions unsupported.
Part III explains the recognition and enforcement law in the U.S., with a focus on
the systemic inadequacy ground and the scholarly criticisms of it. Part IV
explicates the recognition proceedings in the DBCP and in the Lago Agrio
litigation. The Article concludes in Part V that the courts’ avoidance of the
systemic inadequacy ground relates to the rhetorical context of the proceedings:
because of the political ramifications of insulting foreign sovereigns, the
appellate courts avoid addressing the issue. The resulting irony is that the
appellate courts insult everyone else by ignoring the states’ recognition statutes,

17. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
18. E.g., Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1589–90; Hermann, supra note 16, at 468; Steven D. Smith,
Rhetoric and Rationality in the Law of Negligence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 277, 293, 298 (1984).
19. E.g., MACCORMICK, supra note 15, at 12, 16, 104; Smith, supra note 18, at 298.
20. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1561; see the discussion on rhetoric and the rule of law as articulated by
MacCormick infra Part.IIC; see also Jeff Todd, Undead Precedent: The Curse of a Holding “Limited to Its
Facts”, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 67, 72 (2007) (“Courts wish to promote justice and seek to avoid arbitrary
decisions-making,” and “[a]dhering to precedent fosters the appearance of certainty and impartiality.”).
21. See Todd, supra note 20, at 72; Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When
Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 632–33 (1990).
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twisting the precedent of other courts, rejecting the district court’s well-reasoned
findings and conclusions, offering inconsistent authority for future litigation, and
denying justice to the parties by refusing them the rule of law.
II. RHETORIC AND LAW IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS
One of the curious ironies of the law, which traces its roots to classical
22
rhetoric, is that it denies its own rhetoricity. Rather than acknowledge that the
result of a given case is shaped by multiple competing discourses to arrive at a
best answer, a judicial opinion pretends to offer the right answer. The reason is
simple: the rule of law requires rules of law that are clear, intelligible, consistent,
and predictable for the final and conclusive resolution of disputes. To
acknowledge that a hard case could go any number of ways—that the relevant
statutes and precedents admit to multiple interpretations—invites criticism of the
legitimacy not just of the resolution of the case at hand but of the entire process
of reaching that decision.
But a rhetorical critic need not question the legitimacy of the entire legal
system to engage in the “complex task of legal interpretation” of a particular
23
issue. A commonplace of the law is that it is always something arguable, not
something logically certain. Thus, rhetoric, as a method of persuasion that
incorporates logic, supports the ideal that justice can be afforded through a final
judgment or appellate opinion so long as those decisions are rational and
reasonable. When judicial opinions fail to follow the rules of appellate review,
when they disregard the established norms for interpreting statutes and
precedents, and when they decline to offer an explanation for their conclusions,
they deny justice. They fail to provide the parties with reasons to support the
finding for or against them, create precedent which injects uncertainty into that
issue for future litigants and diminish the rule of law and respect for the integrity
of the legal system.
A. The Law Emerges from Practice: A Rhetorical Understanding of Justice
One major modern rhetorician, Chaim Perelman, “elucidate[s] principles of
justice” for a new rhetoric about how we reason and thence arrive at reasonable
24
action. His theory “rests on the idea that gaps exist between reason and
25
justice.” Ambiguity in law arises in four contexts: “when there is no applicable

22. MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE 1 (2005).
23. See Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 LEGAL
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 11 (2010).
24. Mootz, supra note 15, at 514–18; see CHAIM PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF
ARGUMENT (1963) (collecting Perelman’s essays about law and rhetoric).
25. Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566, 572 (1994).
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rule because the case is one of first impression; when the applicable rule is
subject to more than one meaning; when an otherwise applicable rule is claimed
to be invalid; and, finally, when a conflict exists between two potentially
26
applicable rules.” The resolution of legal problems occurs through informal
reasoning to arrive at adherence rather than through formal logic to arrive at
truth; thus, “ambiguity is never entirely avoidable because the language of legal
27
argument is always open to multiple interpretations.”
Drawing on the rhetoric of Perelman, as well as the hermeneutics of Hans
Georg Gadamer, Francis J. Mootz advances a rhetorical understanding of justice
28
as arising from the context in which litigation occurs. He rejects the view of
legal positivism (as well as the older natural law tradition), which separates the
29
social element of legal practice from principles of justice. Legal positivism
distinguishes between theory and practice and between the moral inquiry about
30
law and its application through procedure. Accordingly, positivists consider the
“substantive justice of a law . . . only when the law is enacted - or [when] a judge
31
[fills] a ‘gap’ in the law.” They ignore the rhetorical knowledge that emerges
from the “myriad argumentative moves made by all concerned over the life of the
32
case.”
By erecting an artificial barrier, positivists overlook that these interactions,
whether procedures in court or activities outside it, are “the requirements of
33
justice” and thus cannot be separated from the substantive law. Mootz contends
that law cannot be “understood abstractly but only in reference to its application
34
to a specific case.” Because we can understand justice only through its
rhetorical context, “[t]he activity of invention is the critical element of legal
35
practice.” Rather than a fixed target, “justice is a quality of becoming,” a set of
commonplaces for argumentation to help discussants determine where they stand
36
and to impel them forward. Mootz therefore rejects justice as a set of pre-given
substantive rules and instead locates it “in the interstices of the practice of re-

26. Id. at 573.
27. Id. at 572–73; see Hermann, supra note 15, at 471–722 (“This process of argumentation aims not at
truth but agreement. This is because argument does not lead to a determined solution, but rather acceptable or
agreed upon conclusions.”).
28. Mootz, supra note 15, passim; see White, supra note 15, at 695 (“Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like
law, it invents out of something rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and among
particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others in a particular situation, about concerns that are
real and important to somebody, and speaking a particular language.”)
29. Id. at 579.
30. Id.
31. Mootz, supra note 15, at 579; Id.
32. Id. at 575–76, 579.
33. Id. at 579.
34. Id. at 577.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 580.
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creating the law and taking appropriate action within the context of an individual
37
case.” This practice involves not just the litigants, but also “[l]egislators, judges,
38
and juries,” and it is to the rhetorical role of judges in “re-creating the law” that
this Article turns.
B. The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion and the Need for Reasonableness
Since classical times, rhetoricians have addressed the importance of
39
precedent in making legal arguments. The topoi, or topics, are lists of recurring
arguments classical rhetoricians conceived as figurative “places” where
40
41
arguments reside. One forensic topic is “previous decisions,” or precedent. The
ancients “compiled a nearly comprehensive catalogue of all the points that
42
advocates must consider when making arguments based on precedent.” For
example, Aristotle wrote that “[t]he decision may be on the point at issue, or on a
point like it, or on the opposite point,” and that it should be widely accepted or
43
accepted by the judges in the case at hand. The Rhetorica ad Herennium listed
the ways that citation to precedent might be faulty, such as “if the judgment to an
unlike matter, or one not in dispute, or is of such a kind that previous decision
either in greater number or of greater appropriateness [could] be offered by the
44
adversaries.” The topoi continue in contemporary practice in the “relatively
standard ways in which lawyers distinguish and connect cases, broaden and
45
narrow precedents, distinguish and construct lines of authority.”
Lawyers are not the only ones who engage in precedential manipulation,
however: “once the judge has decided the case before her, she may assume a role
as advocate that is in certain respects indistinguishable from the role that was
46
played by the lawyers who argued the case.” The judge therefore defends her
position to a variety of audiences—“appellate courts, the legal community, the
losing party, . . . and the public at large”—that the decision is right and the losing

37. Id. at 580–81.
38. Id.
39. FROST, supra note 22, at 1 (2005).
40. Id. at 27; see J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of
Legal Reason, in LAW’S STORIES; NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz
eds., 1996).
41. FROST, supra note 22, at 28.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 164–65).
44. Id. (citing ANONYMOUS, RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM 143).
45. Balkin, supra note 40, at 219. For Balkin, “[d]octrinal categories and distinctions are topics woven
into the fabric of the law.” Id. For another classical rhetorical approach to handling precedent that applies
syllogisms rather than topoi, see Kirsten K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to
Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483 (2003).
46. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1561.
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47

party’s is wrong. The irony is that this rhetorical endeavor, this appeal to
stakeholders in the outcome of the litigation, entails the denial of its own
48
rhetoricity. Judges downplay the suasory elements of their opinion through
moves that are themselves rhetorical: assuming an impersonal voice that is
neutral and objective; making highly rational arguments that take the form of
deductive, syllogistic proofs; and backing these “by as many authorities as
49
circumstances require.” Judicial opinions “will almost always be written in a
tone of impersonality suggesting that the legal materials themselves, rather than
50
the personal desires of the judge, required the result in question.” Through these
techniques the judge demonstrates that the right, indeed the inevitable, answer
51
has been found.
This view, “that there is a determinate correct decision in ‘hard cases,’”
52
prevails in law. However, legal rhetoricians assume that decisions are
indeterminate: “there are prior decisions similar or related by analogy to both
53
sides of almost any difficult or important issue.” As an institutional and social
matter, the view of one side to the litigation must be accepted as right, such as
54
“the correct reading of the statute being interpreted.” Legal arguments are not
the same as philosophical ones, however; rather than aim at truth, legal
55
arguments aim at “acceptable or agreed upon conclusions.” Because they seek
agreement through argument, the authority of the decision must be “evaluated by
56
the persuasiveness of the reasons given.”
From this perspective, the same techniques judges use to show that the case
was rightly decided also serve the rhetorical purpose of persuading the audience
that the decision is authoritative, and therefore acceptable.

47. Id.
48. Mootz, supra note 15, at 567 (“[L]egal practice involves the rhetorical suppression of its
rhetoricity.”); see Davis, supra note 15, at 676 (“[T]he law does not see itself, and many scholars investigating
law do not see it, as a product of rhetoric or amenable to rhetorical criticism.”); Berger, supra note 23, at 14
(2010) (“[O]ne of the most remarkable features of the rhetoric of law is the law’s continuing denial that it is
rhetoric.”) (emphasis in original).
49. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1561–62; see Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in
LAW’S STORIES; NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 188–89, 211 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.,
1996) (noting that judicial opinions “will almost always be written in a tone of impersonality, suggesting that
the legal materials themselves rather than the personal desires of the judge, required the result in question….”).
50. Levinson, supra note 49, at 188.
51. Id. at 189; Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1562; see id. at 1589 (“[J]udges seek to persuade their
audiences . . . that the case in question has been fairly heard and rightly decided.”).
52. Hermann, supra note 16, at 468. (quoting D. Kairys, Legal Reasoning, THE POLICIES OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE at 13–14 (1982)).
53. Id.; see Berger, supra note 23, at 10 (“[R]hetoric reminds us that in ‘hard cases,’ the legal language
rarely ‘fits’ and the legal rules rarely compel the result.”); Smith, supra note 18, at 298 (“Few cases present an
‘all or nothing’ situation.”).
54. Hermann, supra note 16, at 508.
55. Id. at 472.
56. Id. at 509.
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As Dean Mootz writes:
Ultimately, judicial consideration of the case and issuance of a written
opinion mark a distinct rhetorical practice shaped by the judge’s effort
first to persuade herself and then to persuade the parties in the litigation
and the hypothetical collection of all reasonable lawyers. In some high
profile cases, the judge might even view the audience of her opinion as
57
the citizenry at large.
While viewing law as rhetoric rejects the possibility of one right result, it
nevertheless “reaffirms [the law’s] integrity and legitimacy as a practice of
58
securing reasonable adherence.” Litigants may not expect a “single,
59
unquestionably correct result,” but they “nonetheless value rationality.” Gerald
60
B. Wetlaufer calls this the problem of legitimacy. Decisions that demonstrate
their impartiality and adherence to statutes and precedent sustain the rule of law
because they are perceived as “fair, right, and legitimate,” while those that do not
61
adhere to precedent diminish the rule of law.
C. Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: The Need for Judicial Opinions to
Demonstrate Predictability and Consistency in the Treatment of Legal
Sources
Neil MacCormick also recognized that law is “[the] site of bitter and drawnout arguments and disputes,” arguments “cast doubt even on what have hitherto
62
seemed law’s most cherished certainties.” Yet, certainty in law is not about
finding absolute truth; rather, the rule of law requires predictability. “[P]reannounced rules that are clear and intelligible,” offer consistency and coherence
articulated in “a great body of carefully recorded precedents” so that persons can
63
have a framework for their lives. Justice requires that current cases should be
decided like previous, relevant cases. For the legal system to be impartial, it must
avoid “frivolous variation in the pattern of decision-making from one judge or
64
court to another.” Justice therefore demands justification: judicial decisions
65
must be supported by reasoning stated explicitly in the judicial opinion.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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Mootz, supra note 15, at 571.
Id. at 568.
Smith, supra note 18, at 293.
Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1561.
Id.
MACCORMICK, supra note 15, at 13.
Id. at 12, 16.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
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In the process of litigation, the parties present “rival possible meanings”
about how the law supports their case; the court concludes which is stronger and
66
reaches a decision. The decision turns on the “understanding of a statutory or
67
other binding text.” For example, when applying a statute, the court must
interpret some or all of its terms, plus interpret and evaluate the facts to see “if
68
they really fit the statute.” MacCormick contends that “[r]easons can and should
69
be given for preferred interpretations that are decisive in the case.” If the
statutory provision has been interpreted a certain way by one court in the legal
system, then it ought to be interpreted the same way by other courts in that
70
system. “To decide the case and justify [the] decision, . . . reasons should be
given for the preferred alternative, the preferred line of decision for this and like
71
cases.” Though the rhetorician recognizes that justification of a decision is not
always conclusive in favor of one interpretation over another, justifications are
necessary to show that the ruling is supported by, and does not contradict,
72
“established rules of law.”
Thus conceived, judicial tools that help achieve consistency like the canons
of statutory construction and the doctrine of stare decisis reinforce the rhetorical
soundness of an opinion. For example, they offer individuals certainty in the law
73
because they allow “people to rationally order their conduct and affairs.” And
consistency in the application of the law allows courts to “treat similarly situated
74
litigants equally.” Applying these tools demonstrates to parties, other courts,
75
and all readers that the court adheres to “reasoned policy choices.” In the words
of the Supreme Court, stare decisis “permits society to presume that bedrock
principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and
thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government,
76
both in appearance and in fact.”

66. Id. at 123.
67. Id. at 122.
68. Id. at 42.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 128 “The proposed solution [of] the case, and the legal interpretation which governs it, have to
be constructed in a manner that shows its consistency with pre-established law according to the [favored]
interpretation of [the court].” Id. at 53.
71. Id. at 102–03.
72. Id. at 104.
73. Todd, supra note 20, at 70 (quoting Grapevine Excavation, Inc. v. Md. Lloyds, 35 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.
2000)); see Adam W. Kiracofe, Note, The Codified Canons of Statutory Construction: A Response and
Proposal to Nicholas Rosenkranz’s Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 84 B.U. L. REV. 571, 574 (2004).
74. Todd, supra note 20, at 70 (citing Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 369
(1988)).
75. See Kiracofe, supra note 73, at 575.
76. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1986); see Todd, supra note 20, at 71 (quoting Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (Justice Harlan likewise offered one justification for not
lightly overruling past decisions is “the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a course of
impersonal and reasoned judgments.”).
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D. Analyzing Judicial Opinions: Uncovering the Silenced Voices and Hidden
Ambiguities
In analyzing judicial opinions, the rhetorician must consider not only how
judges treat legal sources but also how they obfuscate or avoid them. By
emphasizing finality, courts minimize or even exclude some voices and therefore
reject the possibility of a different outcome. James Boyd White writes that
judicial opinions are too often the “bureaucratic expression of ends-means
rationality” that tend toward reduction: by focusing on the end result, the opinion
77
presents only those means which help attain the end result. While the tendency
in law is to exclude that which does not lead to certainty in results, a rhetorical
approach to law corrects this reduction by providing terms that bring into “our
78
zone of attention and field of discourse what others . . . cut out.” By doing so
the legal rhetorician not only recognizes but embraces the “radical uncertainty of
79
most forms of knowledge.” Rhetorical criticism therefore begins with the
questions: “[W]hat voices does the law allow to be heard, what relations does it
80
establish among them? With what voice, or voices, does the law itself speak?”
In like fashion, Kenneth Burke seeks a multiplicity of perspectives, even
conflicting ones, to “reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily
81
82
arise.” Burke calls his rhetorical system dramatism. While an analytical
method based upon a literary genre may seem to have limited utility in a practical
field like law, Burke like other rhetoricians, situates knowledge as arising from
83
human interaction and verbal exchange. Drama therefore offers an apt
metaphor, because it is an art, like other literary genres, constructed of dialogue
and weighted with symbolism, but one that depends upon performance by fleshand-blood actors on a physical stage driving toward some denouement or
84
resolution. Conceived as drama, litigation is a performance among numerous
actors that leads to a judgment and perhaps a judicial opinion, where the
77. Davis, supra note 15, at 697, 699.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 697–98.
81. BURKE, supra note 16, at xviii (emphasis in original);
82. Id. at xxii; WILLIAM H. RUECKERT, KENNETH BURKE AND THE DRAMA OF HUMAN RELATIONS xv (2d
ed. 1982) (“[D]ramatism becomes Burke’s final and coherent way of viewing man and the universe.”).
83. BURKE, supra note 16, at 33 (“Dialectically considered (that is, ‘dramatistically’ considered) men are
not only in nature. The cultural accretions made possible by the language motive become a ‘second nature’ with
them. Here again we confront the ambiguities of substance, since symbolic communication is not a merely
external instrument, but also intrinsic to men as agents.”) (emphasis in original); see Davis, supra note 15, at
677 (writing that legal rhetoricians conceive of rhetoric as an exploration of the meaning-making process
through which justice is achieved).
84. BURKE, supra note 16, at 7 (“Thus, when the curtain rises to disclose a given stage-set, this stage-set
contains, simultaneously, implicitly, all that the narrative is to draw out as a sequence, explicitly. Or, if you will,
the stage-set contains the action ambiguously (as regards the norms of action)—and in the course of the play’s
development this ambiguity is converted into a corresponding articulacy.”) (emphasis in original).
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ambiguities of all the potential results are eventually given one decisive
85
interpretation. Judicial opinions thus direct the attention toward the right result.
But in the selection of one reality, the judicial opinion also contains the
86
deflection away from other possibilities. For Burke, “words are agents of
power; . . . they are value-laden, ideologically motivated, and morally and
emotionally weighted instruments of purpose, persuasion, and representation . . .
87
88
.” So it is to the words of the judicial opinion itself that the critic must turn to
89
study and clarify these other possibilities, “the resources of ambiguity.”
Judges engage in a number of strategies to avoid deciding cases on the basis
90
of controversial moral and political grounds. Laura E. Little argues that “judges
may choose a resolution of the controversy that is less likely to require a change
in dominant social thinking or to foster especially potent animosity on the part of
91
a particular group.” Especially when construing legislative and constitutional
provisions that deal with the court’s power, as with jurisdictional statutes, courts
92
avoid candor. Some avoidance strategies that remove, reduce or downplay the
judge’s responsibility for a decision involve word choice and grammatical
constructions, such as writing in the agentive passive voice or employing
93
nominalizations. Another way that writers distance themselves from a text is
abdication to other authority:
Thus, when a court protests strenuously that its holding is mandated by
some authority other than itself, one may ask why the court wishes to
avoid direct responsibility for the ruling. Language pointing to
responsibility borne by another branch of government—the states,
Congress, the executive—may of course suggest no more than the
court’s commitment to judicial restraint or denunciation of the positivist
85. KENNETH BURKE, Terministic Screens, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: ESSAYS ON LIFE,
LITERATURE, AND METHOD 44, 44–46 (1966).
86. BURKE, supra note 16, at 17 (“[O]ne may deflect attention from scenic matters by situating the
motives of an act in the agent . . . : or conversely, one may deflect attention from the criticism of personal
motives by deriving an act or attitude not from traits of the agent from the nature of the situation.”); Delia B.
Conti, Narrative Theory and the Law: A Rhetorician’s Invitation to the Legal Academy, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 457,
466 (2001).
87. GREIG E. HENDERSON, KENNETH BURKE: LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION 118
(1988); see Conti, supra note 86, at 466 ([E]very utterance is an invitation to persuade.”).
88. BURKE, supra note 16, at xv, xviii–xix, ; see id. at 33 (“[T]he dramatistic analysis of motives has its
point of departure in the subject of verbal action (in thought, speech, and document).”) (emphasis in original);
Jeff Todd, Phantom Torts Forum Non Conveniens Blocking Statutes: Irony and Metonym in Nicaraguan
Special Law 364, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 291, passim (2012) (applying Burke’s master tropes of irony
and metonymy to analyze judicial opinions that treated forum non conveniens blocking statutes).
89. BURKE, supra note 16, at xix.
90. Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46
UCLA L. REV. 75, 86 (1998).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 135.
93. Id. at 97–98.
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concept. . . . Or the court may believe that formality and detachment are
necessary to preserve the appearance of propriety and impartiality. When
the attempted detachment is pronounced, however, one may conclude
that the substance of the decision or its likely consequences make the
94
court uncomfortable.
From an analysis of judicial opinions, Little noted the “pervasiveness of all
95
obfuscatory devices.”
III. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS AND THE SYSTEMIC INADEQUACY GROUND
FOR NONRECOGNITION
For the prevailing plaintiff in a foreign court, the judgment means success in
battle, not victory in war. Defendants, even multinational corporations, often
have no assets in those countries. Plaintiffs must therefore seek recognition and
enforcement in the court of a country where the defendants have assets. For US
96
corporations, this often means a US court. While foreign money judgments are
entitled to a presumption of validity, the law also provides several grounds upon
97
which a court can, and in some instances must, deny recognition. One of these
grounds, that the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due
process of law, has come under severe scrutiny by numerous critics.
A. The (Non)Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments
1. A Primer on the Recognition Acts
The Supreme Court addressed the recognition and enforcement of foreign
98
money judgments over a century ago in Hilton v. Guyot. It referred to comity,
“the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the . . . judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
99
under the protection of its laws.” Because comity “is neither a matter of
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon
the other” comity counsels against rejecting the acts of another sovereign’s

94. Id. at 102–03.
95. Id. at 140.
96. Weston, supra note 10, at 736.
97. See Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 39 (“Foreign judgments are entitled to a strong presumption
of validity in U.S. courts.”).
98. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
99. Id. at 164.
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100

courts. Yet, this presumes that the foreign proceedings were conducted “under
a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice”
and that there is nothing to show prejudice “in the system of laws under which
101
[the foreign court] was sitting,” among other considerations. If such grounds
102
exist, then the foreign judgment might be impeached.
Although current recognition law have their basis in Hilton, state law
controls the recognition and enforcement of foreign money judgements under the
103
Erie doctrine. Most states have codified the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment
104
Recognition Act of 1962 (1962 Recognition Act), although a growing number
of states have adopted the more recent Uniform Foreign-Country Money
105
Judgments Recognition Act of 2005 (2005 Recognition Act). Those states that
have adopted neither of the Acts base recognition and enforcement on Hilton and
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which, as noted above, are
106
substantially similar to the Acts. The grounds for nonrecognition (though not
the case-law interpreting them) are therefore nearly the same in every state, with
107
a few variations that will be discussed below.
A US court can enter an order requiring the judgment debtor (the defendant
108
in the foreign proceedings) to pay the judgment creditor (the plaintiff).
However, the Acts apply only to certain types of foreign judgments: those that
109
are “final, conclusive, and enforceable.” To understand the Acts, we must
distinguish between recognition and enforcement: enforcement occurs only after
110
the judgment is recognized. Enforcement means that the “legal procedures of
the state to ensure that the judgment debtor complies with the judgment are

100. Id. at 163–64; see Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 39 (“Foreign judgments are entitled to a
strong presumption of validity in U.S. courts.”).
101. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202–03.
102. Id. at 203; see Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Nations are not
inexorably bound to enforce judgments obtained in each other’s courts.”).
103. Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, 24 (citing Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938));
Heiser, supra note 7, at 634.
104. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT 13 U.L.A. pt. 2 (1962)
[hereinafter “1962 RECOGNITION ACT”].
105. 2005 RECOGNITION ACT. As of February 2013, thirty-three jurisdictions had enacted either the 1962
Act or the 2005 Act, with eighteen subsequently enacting legislation based on the latter. An additional state has
enacted the 2005 Act and another has introduced new legislation based on the 2005 Act. UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Acts.aspx?title=recognition (last visited Feb. 26, 2013)(
on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
106. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1464–65; Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 9, at 24 n.143;
Heiser, supra note 1, at 634–35; see Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164–64.
107. Heiser, supra note 1, at 634–35.
108. Id.
109. Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 25 (citing 1962 RECOGNITION ACT § 2), 26 (citing 2005
RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a)(2)).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. b (“The
judgment of a foreign state may not be enforced unless it is entitled to recognition.”).
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111

available to the judgment creditor to assist in the collection of the judgment.”
Courts can enforce any judgment entered by a foreign court that is final—even if
it is on appeal in the foreign country—and grants money damages rather than
112
equitable relief, taxes, fines, or matrimonial support. So long as these criteria
are met, the judgment is conclusive and therefore entitled to the same full faith
and credit that a U.S. court gives to a judgment entered in a sister state; in other
words, it is entitled to recognition as though required by the Full Faith and Credit
113
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
In certain circumstances, however, a foreign judgment will be deemed nonconclusive—or under the 2005 Act non-recognizable—and thus not subject to
enforcement. Some of the grounds for nonrecognition are mandatory while others
are discretionary. If the defendant makes a showing under any one of the former,
the court must make a finding of non-conclusiveness/nonrecognition, but if the
defendant makes a showing under any of the latter, the court has discretion to
114
make that finding. The mandatory grounds are the same under both Acts:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements
of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.

115

The six discretionary grounds from the 1962 Act are essentially the same in
the 2005 Act:
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive
notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action] . . . on which the judgment is based is repugnant
to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be
settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

224

2005 Recognition Act § 3 cmt. 3; Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 25.
Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 25.
Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 36; Heiser, supra note 1, at 635.
Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1465–66.
1962 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(1)-()–(3); 2005 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1)-()–(3).

01_TODD_VER_8-29-13_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/29/2014 2:58 PM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 45
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign
116
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
The 2005 Act adds two discretionary grounds:
(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial
doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the
judgment; or
(8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment
117
was not compatible with the requirements of due process of law.
One final factor from Hilton v. Guyot is reciprocity: comity does not require
enforcement of a foreign judgment if the foreign country would not likewise
118
enforce a US judgment. Both Acts have rejected reciprocity, but at least eight
states—including some that have adopted one of the two Acts—have some type
119
of reciprocity as a ground.
Although judgment debtors seem to have an arsenal of twelve separate
grounds, most of them are not available in the context of transnational mass tort
litigation. First, assuming that reciprocity or the lack of integrity and due process
in the specific proceedings might be at issue, the judgment creditors can avoid
120
US states that require reciprocity or that have enacted the 2005 Act. They can
choose to seek recognition in any other state that has personal jurisdiction over
the judgment debtors and where they have assets, which for multinational
121
corporations means many if not every state. Even if plaintiffs cannot enforce
the judgment because the corporation has no assets in that state, plaintiffs can
still have the judgment recognized by a US court, which makes the judgment
enforceable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in any other US state,
122
including those where the corporations do have assets.
Judgment debtors may try to seek preemptive nonrecognition in the most
defendant-friendly states. While the plaintiff as judgment creditor typically files
an action to have the foreign money judgment recognized, judgment debtors in
123
several instances have sought injunctions against enforcement. One author in
116. 1962 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1)-()–(6); see 2005 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(1)-()–(6).
117. 2005 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(7)-()–(8).
118. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1464 (citing 159 U.S. at 214).
119. Id. at 1468–69.
120. Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 40; see Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 18 (“[P]laintifffriendly states effectively set the standards for interstate tort litigation.”).
121. See Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 40.
122. Id. at 40; Carodine, supra note 3, at 1242.
123. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam); Investorshub.com, Inc. v. Mina Mar Group, Inc., Case No. 4:11cv9-RH/WS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87566 (N.D. Fla. June 20, 2011); Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23423
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006), aff’d 518 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008); Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No. CV 03 8846 NM
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2007 opined that it is “not clear” whether these actions even come within the
124
scope of the Recognition Acts. The Recognition Acts do not address
declaratory judgments, and they define their scope by reference to the
125
conclusiveness or recognizability of the foreign money judgment itself. Except
for the Second Circuit in the Lago Agrio litigation discussed infra, no courts have
tackled the question squarely. The closest may be a plurality of the Ninth Circuit
sitting en banc in Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme,
in which Yahoo! brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) to have
a French injunction (not a foreign money judgment) prohibiting it from linking to
Nazi memorabilia auction sites declared non-recognizable under the public
126
policy ground. Judge W.A. Fletcher wrote that the 1962 Recognition Act
adopted by California “is not directly applicable to this case, for it does not
authorize enforcement of injunctions. But neither does the Uniform Act prevent
enforcement of injunctions, for its savings clause specifies that the Act does not
foreclose enforcement of foreign judgments ‘in situations not covered by [the
127
Act].’” Because the Uniform Act did not apply, he opined that the court should
“look to general principles of comity” articulated in the Restatement (Third) of
128
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Three judges found the issue
was not ripe and three others that the courts of California lacked personal
jurisdiction, so by a vote of six-to-five the court reversed the district court’s anti129
enforcement injunction.
No court has held that preemptive nonrecognition is forbidden by the
Recognition Acts. Indeed, judgment debtors in several cases have prevailed as
130
plaintiffs against the judgment debtor. One oft-cited case is Matusevitch v.
Telnikoff, where the court found that Telnikoff’s English defamation judgment
against Matusevitch was not entitled to recognition because it was repugnant to
the public policies of Maryland and the United States as a matter of law and
131
granted summary judgment in favor of Matusevitch. A more recent case is
Investorshub.com, Inc. v. Mina Mar Group, Inc., where the judgment debtor from
132
a Canadian defamation action brought an action under the DJA. After the
(PJWx), 2005 WL 6184247 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005); Younis Bros. & Co. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins. Co., 167
F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995); Drake v. Brady,
No. A08-2137, 2009, Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1049 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009).
124. Luthin, supra note 2, at 134. Another article addressing preemptive nonrecognition in 2006
questioned whether one attempt at preemptive nonrecognition was “the vanguard of a new trend or an
exceptional kamikaze mission.” Gul, supra note 5, at 97.
125. Luthin, supra note 2, at 134.
126. 433 F.3d at 1201–02, 1204.
127. Id. at 1213 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1713.1(2), 1713.7).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1201.
130. See notes 133–37 and accompanying text.
131. 877 F. Supp. 1., 2 (D.D.C. 1995).
132. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87566.
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parties so stipulated, the district court declared that the case could not be
133
enforced in the U.S. pursuant to Florida’s Recognition Act. The court in Shell
134
Oil Co. v. Franco, a case brought by the judgment debtor under the DJA, found
that the Nicaraguan court in DBCP litigation did not have personal jurisdiction
135
over Shell and entered an injunction against enforcement.
Even when the judgment creditors have failed in their attempt at preemptive
nonrecognition, it is for reasons unrelated to the applicability of the Recognition
Act. For example, in Drake v. Brady, the judgment debtors offered no proof that
136
the Canadian court lacked personal jurisdiction over them under Canadian law.
In a case affirmed by the Second Circuit, Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, the judgment
debtor sought a declaratory judgment that an English defamation judgment was
137
unenforceable under the New York Recognition Act. The trial court found that
it lacked personal jurisdiction over the judgment creditor, and that finding was
138
affirmed. Neither court addressed whether the New York Recognition Act
allowed for, or even applied to, the suit.
While preemptive recognition seems a smart tactic for judgment debtors in
transnational toxic tort cases, the lack of personal jurisdiction in Ehrenfeld and
Yahoo! suggests why they likely will not have an unlimited choice of fora for
preemptive nonrecognition: no state would have personal jurisdiction over these
139
foreign plaintiffs. The only exception would be if the foreign judgment resulted
from an action previously filed in the U.S. but dismissed under FNC. Then, the
judgment debtor could seek nonrecognition in the state where the plaintiffs first
filed their US suits. States where the DBCP cases were filed in the 1980s and
1990s like Texas and Florida, and New York where the Lago Agrio litigation was
first filed, have not adopted the proceeding-specific grounds for nonrecognition
140
in the 2005 Act.
Commentators have suggested that many of the other nonrecognition grounds
141
do not apply for cases that had previously been dismissed for FNC. In an FNC
proceeding, the court determines which of two fora is more convenient for

133. Id. at *5–7.
134. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47557.
135. Id. at *20. The court in Younis Brothers likewise entered an injunction against enforcing a Liberian
judgment, but made no reference to a state Recognition Act. 167 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
136. 2009 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS at *12–13.
137. Case No. 04 Civ. 9641 (RCC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23423 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006), aff’d 518
F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008)).
138. 518 F.3d at 103, 106.
139. See Luthin, supra note 2, at 135 (“[P]rocedures designed to render [foreign money judgments]
unenforceable definitely raise issues of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over the judgment creditor.”).
140. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 36.005; FLA. CODE § 55.605 (West Supp. 2013); N.Y. CODE P.
L. R. 5304 (Consol. 2013).
141. Heiser, supra note 1, at 636 (“Most of the provisions of the UFMJRA do not come into play when a
plaintiff seeks to enforce a foreign judgment rendered after the plaintiff’s action was dismissed by a U.S. court
based on forum none conveniens.”).
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litigating the dispute: the US court or the court of a foreign country, often the
142
plaintiff’s home. To make this determination, a court weighs two sets of
factors: the private interest factors that deal with the parties’ concerns, like access
to sources of proof, and the public interest factors that deal with court concerns,
143
like the congestion of dockets and the need to apply foreign law. Before even
weighing these factors, however, the court has to ensure that the foreign courts
144
are “both available and adequate.” The Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno considers an alternative forum available if the defendant is amenable to
145
process in that jurisdiction. This is a low hurdle for defendants, who will have
consented to personal jurisdiction in the foreign forum; plus, US courts can
condition dismissal on a return jurisdiction clause if the foreign court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, thus ruling out the second and third mandatory
146
grounds. Because the defendant as movant seeks litigation in the foreign forum,
the defendant cannot argue lack of notice, conflict with another judgment,
previous settlement, or the serious inconvenience of the foreign forum.
Accordingly, the only discretionary grounds likely to arise are that the cause of
action upon which the judgment is based violates the public policy of the state or
147
that the judgment was obtained by fraud.
2. The Systemic Inadequacy Ground
The sole mandatory ground that remains is that the judgment was rendered in
a system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
148
the requirements of due process. The key to this provision is “system.” Judge
142. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506–509 (1947); see Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Because of the removal
and venue transfer statutes that were enacted after Gilbert and Koster, the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
federal courts now only applies to lawsuits where one of the litigants is from a foreign country. Martin Davies,
Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 313 (2002).
143. The private interest factors are “the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. Another private interest factor
is the enforceability of any judgment obtained. Id. The public interest factors are administrative difficulties from
the congestion of court dockets; “the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home”; the
burden placed on a jury required to decide a case with no connection to the community; and the appropriateness
of having the dispute tried in a forum familiar with the governing law rather than having another court untangle
conflicts of law and apply foreign laws. Id. at 508–09.
144. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 11, at 1456; Heiser, supra note 1, at 614. For a discussion of how
availability and adequacy are perceived differently in the common law U.S. and the civil law systems of Latin
American countries, see Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: “Availability” and “Adequacy” of Latin
American Fora from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 65 (2003-04).
145. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
146. Heiser, supra note 1, at 614–15.
147. Id. at 636.
148. Unif. Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act § 4(b)(2005).
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Posner in Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden even italicized this word in the Illinois
Recognition Act to emphasize that the analysis considers only the adequacy of
the foreign country’s judicial system as a whole rather than impartiality or lack of
149
due process in individual proceedings. He rejected plaintiffs’ request for an
inquiry into questionable elements of the specific proceedings, rejecting a “retail
150
approach” that would be the equivalent of a “second lawsuit.” Other courts
have followed this interpretation, and it is embraced in the comments to the 2005
151
Recognition Act.
Walter Heiser divides this ground into two separate questions: whether the
nation has an impartial judiciary, and whether it provides procedures compatible
152
with due process. The due process question is difficult for the judgment
creditor to prove because the foreign proceedings need satisfy only an
“international standard of due process,” not the rigorous standards required by
153
the Due Process clauses of the US Constitution. Thus, the foreign procedures
154
must be “fundamentally fair” and not offend “basic fairness”; the foreign courts
155
need not adopt “every jot and tittle” of US due process. Courts have affirmed
basic fairness
even though the foreign procedure did not include the right to crossexamine witnesses, prohibited the defendants from raising certain
defenses and counterclaims, prohibited discovery as to the amount
claimed by the plaintiff, lacked a verbatim transcript, or conditioned
leave to defend on the deposit of an amount equal to the prayer in the
156
complaint.
They have also found that lengthy delays in the foreign legal proceedings do
not violate due process, nor does international due process require oral testimony
157
or compulsory process.
Courts only find systemic inadequacy when there is “‘serious injustice’ or
158
‘outrageous departure from our own [notion] of civilized jurisprudence,’”

149. 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2000).
150. Id. at 477.
151. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1467 (citing 2005 RECOGNITION ACT § 4 cmt. 5, U.L.A. pt.
2, at 27 (Supp. 2011).
152. Heiser, supra note 1, at 638–39; see Kelly, supra note 2, at 563.
153. Heiser, supra note 1, at 639–40. Although personal and subject matter jurisdiction are due process
grounds in U.S. civil procedure, those grounds are treated in separate provisions of the Uniform Acts. Id. at 639.
As noted above, these grounds are unlikely to be present in a boomerang suit.
154. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476–78; Heiser, supra note 1, at 639–40.
155. See Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 41.
156. Heiser, supra note 1, at 640–41 (citations omitted).
157. Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 41–42.
158. See id. (citing Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1987); British
Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1974)).
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which leads to the second type of systemic inadequacy, impartiality of the
foreign judiciary. Here, “the appropriate inquiry is whether the judicial system is
an independent branch of the foreign country’s government and is capable of
159
administering, and does in fact administer justice in a fair manner.” The U.S.
court must find that the foreign tribunal is corrupt and biased or incapable of
160
acting impartially with respect to the defendant. Judge Posner in Ashenden
suggested that nations “whose adherence to the rule of law and commitment to
the norm of due process are open to serious question” could be found inadequate,
161
such as Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Congo. He contrasted those
countries with the courts of the country at issue before him, England, which he
characterized as “the very fount from which our system developed; a system
162
which has procedures and goals which closely parallel our own.”
The entire judicial system of a country has been found inadequate in two
notable cases. In Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, the bank sued the sister of the
163
deposed and exiled Shah of Iran to collect on promissory notes. When she
failed to appear, the court entered a default judgment of $32,000,000 against her,
and the bank sought recognition and enforcement in California, where Pahlavi
164
lived. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s granting Pahlavi’s motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the courts of Iran deny due process: “[t]he
evidence in this case indicated that Pahlavi could not expect fair treatment from
the courts of Iran, could not personally appear before those courts, could not
obtain proper legal representation in Iran, and could not even obtain local
165
witnesses on her behalf.” The evidence showed that Americans in general, and
members of the Shah’s family in particular, could not get a fair trial in Iran
because of strong anti-American sentiments by the Islamist regime that deposed
166
the Shah. The court listed several facts that supported the trial court’s findings:
trials are not held in public, they are highly politicized, the regime does not
believe in an independent judiciary, judges are subject to continuing scrutiny and
threat of sanction, and unrestrained revolutionary courts can take over civil
167
actions.
In Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, a Liberian company filed suit against
Citibank when it liquidated the bank account and paid devalued Liberian dollars
168
rather than US dollars because of civil war in that country. The company won a

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
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Heiser, supra note 1, at 639.
Id.
Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 476 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 1413.
Id. at 1411–13. Indeed, Americans faced physical danger in traveling to Iran. Id. at 1411.
Id. at 1411–12.
45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000).
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breach of contract lawsuit in Liberian court, which was affirmed by the Liberian
169
Supreme Court, and the company sought to enforce in the U.S. At the time of
the Liberian lawsuit, the nation was embroiled in a civil war so that a “bleak
170
picture” of the judiciary emerged. Rather than follow constitutional procedures,
factions controlling various parts of the country determined the appointment and
171
removal of judges. The courts that did exist were barely functioning,
“hampered by inefficiency and corruption” when they were, and “subject to
172
political, social, familial, and financial suasion.” This situation continued even
173
after the war ended. The district court concluded that the judgment was
unenforceable as a matter of law: “[o]n the record before the Court, a reasonable
factfinder could only conclude that, at the time the judgment at issue here was
rendered, the Liberian judicial system was not fair and impartial and did not
174
comport with the requirements of due process.” The Second Circuit affirmed
175
that Citibank was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
US courts consider a wide range of sources in determining systemic
inadequacy because this consideration is neither a question of fact nor a question
of law, “but it is a question about the law of a foreign nation, and in answering
such questions a federal court is not limited to the consideration of evidence that
would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence; any relevant material
176
or source may be consulted.” Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
gives a court broad freedom to consider any relevant material about foreign law,
including unsworn testimony of the opinion letter of a foreign lawyer, evidence
177
from non-lawyers, and judicial notice of the words of foreign statutes. Thus,
courts rely upon expert witnesses, which may include declarations from US
diplomats to those countries as well as legal scholars and judges from those
178
countries. Courts also cite legal sources, both US cases and scholarship as well
179
as the law of foreign nations, which are often attached to expert reports.
Another routine source is the annual Country Reports prepared by the US State
Department, which includes sections about the effectiveness of the judiciary and

169. Id. at 280–81.
170. Id. at 280.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 287; see N.Y. C. P. L. R. 5304(a) (Consol. 2013) (systemic inadequacy ground).
175. Bridgeway, 201 F.3d at 142.
176. Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
177. Davies, supra note 142, at 354–55.
178. See e.g., Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting declaration of
Laurence Pope, a State Department official); Bridgeway, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 279 (citing sworn statement of H.
Varney G. Sherman, a Liberian attorney and former president of the Liberian National Bar Association).
179. See e.g., Pahlavi, 58 F.3d at 1412 (taking judicial notice of Circuit Court opinions that had found
that a fair trial in Iran was not possible); S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enterprises Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 207
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing law review articles about Romania).
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its susceptibility to bias and politicization. Other reports from US governmental
agencies, as well as the reports of non-governmental organizations and even
media sources detailing the history and politics of the country, are also
181
considered.
For example, the Second Circuit in Bridgeway found that Citibank “ha[d]
come forward with sufficiently powerful and un-contradicted documentary
evidence describing the chaos within the Liberian judicial system during the
period of interest to this case to have met [its] burdens and to be entitled to
182
judgment as a matter of law.” Citibank had relied upon two sources: affidavits
of H. Varney G. Sherman, Citibank’s Liberian counsel, and several years’ of the
183
US State Department Country Reports for Liberia. The court did not address
the admissibility of the affidavit because it was not contested; it did note that
Sherman’s description of the courts as being subject to political influence
184
supported the district court’s conclusions. The court also found the Country
Reports admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), which permits
“factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
185
granted by law.” The court finally rejected Bridgeway’s objection to the district
court’s taking judicial notice of historical facts drawn from sources like an
encyclopedia and CNN news reports, finding that they “were merely background
186
history.”
B. Criticisms of the Systemic Inadequacy Ground
1. It Violates the Constitution by Requiring Courts to Engage in Acts of
State and to Answer Political Questions
Montre Carodine offers a forceful argument against the systemic inadequacy
ground: it violates the separation of powers under the Constitution because
applying an international standard for due process forces courts to make foreign

180. E.g., Pahlavi, 58 F.3d at 1411–12; Bridgeway, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 280; see Dhooge Mandatory, supra
note 9, at 44. To access the Country Reports, see U.S. Dep’t of State, Human Rights Reports, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ (last accessed Feb. 26, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
181. E.g., Pahlavi, 58 F.3d at 1411 (citing consular information sheets that gave travel warnings from
1981 through 1993 and warned of anti-American sentiments); Bridgeway, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 278 n.2 (taking
judicial notice of online materials such as CNN News Reports and the Encarta Multimedia Encyclopedia entry
for Liberia); S. C. Chimexim, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 207 n.2 (citing Judicial Overview of Central and Eastern Europe
by the American Bar Association Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) (1996)); Daniel N. Nelson,
Romania, ENCARTA MULTIMEDIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (Microsoft 1997); see Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at
44–45.
182. Bridgeway, 201 F.3d at 141–42.
183. Id. at 142.
184. Id. at 142 n.3 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482 cmt. b (1987)).
185. Id. at 143–44 (citing Pahlavi, 58 F.3d at 1411).
186. Id. at 144.
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policy. First, she likens this ground to the state statute in Zschernig v. Miller
that the Supreme Court struck down “‘as an intrusion by the State into the field
of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the
188
Congress.’” That statute prohibited foreigners from inheriting property without
189
engaging in an analysis of the inheritance rights in the foreign country. The
Supreme Court found that the statute made “unavoidable judicial criticism of
190
nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our own,” and held such
191
foreign policy-making by states is prohibited. The systemic inadequacy ground
for nonrecognition is another state statute requiring state courts to make their
own foreign policy, so Carodine concludes that it too violates the act of state
192
doctrine.
For federal courts with diversity jurisdiction, the systemic inadequacy ground
193
also violates the political question doctrine. This is a judicially created doctrine
of restraint also rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution: courts
194
will decline to consider questions that are better left to the political branches.
The Supreme Court has held that questions of foreign relations are inherently
195
political and therefore best left to the Executive and Legislative branches.
2. It Lacks Coherent Standards of Applicability
While problematic from a doctrinal perspective, the presence of political
questions also creates problems in application because courts hesitate to find
systemic inadequacy except for the most politically disfavored or geopolitically
196
insignificant countries. Andreas Lowenfeld has noted that “judges might also
be reluctant to label an entire country as unfair,” offering the example of the

187. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1163–64, 1190–91.
188. Id. at 1192 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968)).
189. 389 U.S. at 430–31.
190. Id. at 440.
191. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1193.
192. Id. at 1195; see Kelly, supra note 2, at 580–81; American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,
424-25 (2003) (striking down California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act as interfering with
President’s conduct of foreign affairs).
193. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1206.
194. Id. at 1195–96, 98.
195. Id. at 1197; see Gul, supra note 5, at 79 (“Particularly problematic is that Hilton comity principles
force U.S. courts to make political judgments about foreign nations and their treatment of U.S. citizens. These
decisions might be more appropriately left to the political branches.”).
196. Kelly, supra note 2, at 579–80 (claiming that courts find systemic inadequacy on in “‘avowed
enemies’” of the US like Iran or “countries of limited geopolitical significance” like Liberia and Nicaragua);
Fitt, supra note 2, at 1031 (“American courts have occasionally refused to enforce foreign judgments on the
grounds of bias or corruption, but such action is typically reserved for only the most chaotic and unjust
systems.”); see In re Arbitration between Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine,
311 F.3d 488, 499 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[Courts] have been reluctant to find foreign courts ‘corrupt’ or biased.’”).
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Ukraine as a hard call but Iran as an easy one. This latter example suggests that,
rather than engage in meaningful analysis, judges might play on stereotypes for
198
some countries. For countries at the margins, however, courts “seem to bend
199
over backward” to avoid a finding of systemic inadequacy. Carodine suggests
that courts might even reward countries that are trying to reform their judiciary to
200
be more like the United States.
Not all courts break upon the lines of political alignment. The Third Circuit
in In Sik Choi v. Hyung Soo Kim applied New Jersey law and found that
procedures in South Korea—not North Korea from Judge Posner’s list of bad
201
countries—did not comport with due process. Choi obtained an order of
202
execution on a promissory note against Kim, who was abroad at the time. The
Third Circuit assumed without deciding that the order of execution was a foreign
203
money judgment. It then analyzed the specific notice provisions of South
Korean law to find that they did not allow Kim to have notice and an opportunity
204
to be heard. The concurring judge would have affirmed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment on an alternate basis: Choi’s order was not a judgment
205
subject to recognition and enforcement.
That a court can refuse to recognize a judgment obtained in US-friendly
South Korea, and on the basis that one law rather than the entire judicial system
violates international standards for due process, demonstrates how the systemic
inadequacy ground requires judges to determine lack of due process “without
206
giving them a concrete standard for doing so.” While scholars note that the
207
recognition laws are remarkably consistent, they nevertheless recognize
problems in a system based on a “patchwork of recommended practices,
208
restatements, and both state and federal case law.” The systemic inadequacy

197. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1213 (citing Discussion of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute, 82 A.L.I. PROC. 94 (2005)).
198. Id. at 1214; see Kelly, supra note 2, at 557 (“In fact, sweeping generalizations about the judicial
systems of foreign nations are not just allowed under current U.S. law, they are required.”).
199. Gul, supra note 5, at 82 (“To their credit, state courts seem cognizant of the special implications of
actions seeking to enforce foreign judgments, and seem to bend over backward to avoid parochialism.”).
200. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1217–20 (discussing S.C. Chimexim, 36 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1999))
(praising Romania for its reform efforts without assessing the fairness of the judiciary).
201. 50 F.3d 244, 248, 250 (3d Cir. 1995).
202. Id. at 246.
203. Id. at 248.
204. Id. at 248–50.
205. Id. at 250 (Lewis, J., concurring).
206. Kelly, supra note 2, at 570; Luthin, supra note 2, at 119 (characterizing the language of the 1962
Recognition Act as “confusing and ambiguous. . . .”).
207. Heiser, supra note 1, at 634–35.
208. Gul, supra note 5, at 69–70; see Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 18; Luthin, supra note 2, at 120
(“These issues have created several layers of non-uniform state law language, implementation, and application
in recognizing and enforcing FMJs.”).
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ground in particular “has rarely been interpreted, applied, or questioned,” so
even looking at extra-jurisdictional cases, courts have few opinions upon which
210
to rely for guidance. The approach is often piece-meal and tailored rather than
211
coherent and predictable. One student commentator wrote, “[d]espite the word
‘uniform’ in the statutes’ titles, their enforcement [by US courts] is anything
212
but.” Saad Gul has characterized the recognition laws in general as offering
213
“somewhat misty standards of substantial justice.”
3. It Is Often Unnecessary
Besides lacking a concrete standard, the systemic inadequacy ground is often
unnecessary because courts can rely upon an alternative basis for nonrecognition
214
in almost all cases where there is also systemic inadequacy. In fact, “judges
have chosen to hinge nonrecognition upon less controversial bases such as lack
215
of jurisdiction, fraud, or the public policy exception.” The 2005 Recognition
Act, which a growing number of states have adopted, minimizes the need for the
systemic inadequacy ground by providing two grounds based upon bias or lack of
216
due process in the specific proceedings as opposed to the entire judicial system.
4. Its Interplay with FNC Creates an “Access-to-Justice” Gap
One final criticism addressed by numerous commentators involves the
application of the systemic inadequacy ground to foreign judgments that had
their genesis in US courts—or similar cases brought against the same corporate
defendants—where the cases were dismissed for FNC. The basic approach to an
FNC determination was described in Part II(B)(2), supra, and a detailed
explication of FNC is beyond the scope of this Article—and has been quite
217
extensively treated by a number of scholars. Accordingly, this subsection

209. Kelly, supra note 2, at 559.
210. See Luthin, supra note 2, at 134 (“Indeed, there have been few cases denying recognition of FMJs
based on the argument that the judicial system failed to provide procedures compatible with due process.”).
211. Gul, supra note 5, at 85; but see Luthin, supra note 2, at 134 (“[T]his may be one of the few areas of
constitutional implications arising from the enforcement of FMJs that appears to be uniform.”).
212. Luthin, supra note 2, at 136.
213. Gul, supra note 5, at 73; see Fitt, supra note 2, at 1041 (“[F]oreign court recipients of American
judicial deference should, at a minimum, be free from systemic bias or corruption. Yet the current formulation
of forum non covneniens and the parallel enforcement of foreign judgments are not adequately designed to
create such assurances.”).
214. Kelly, supra note 2, at 575.
215. Id. at 565.
216. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1234–36; Kelly, supra note 2, at 565.
217. See e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L.
REV. 1081 (2010); Martin Davies, supra note 142, passim.
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analyzes an issue that is considered in both FNC and enforcement proceedings:
the adequacy of the foreign court.
Before balancing the private and public interest factors as part of the FNC
analysis, the court must first find that the foreign country’s courts are available
218
and adequate. Adequacy presents a low hurdle for defendants because the
219
standards for adequacy are lenient, plaintiff-focused, and ex ante. The
defendant need merely prove that the parties will not be deprived of some
220
remedy nor be treated unfairly. The Court in Piper Aircraft held that the
possibility of a change in substantive law that is unfavorable for the plaintiffs
“should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the
221
forum non conveniens inquiry.” An unfavorable change in law “may be given
222
substantial weight” only if the remedy provided “is no remedy at all.” A
foreign court must be “‘adequate’ enough to provide plaintiffs with a meaningful
223
remedy, or at least a remedy that is not clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory.”
Accordingly, while a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the foreign court
makes dismissal inappropriate, the likelihood of smaller damage awards and of
224
fewer—and more difficult to prove—theories of liability does not. Based on the
Piper Aircraft standard, courts have rejected the arguments of plaintiffs that,
unlike the US, their home countries did not have strict liability or punitive
damages, did not provide for jury trials, and did not allow contingency fee
225
contracts. They likewise rejected arguments about the foreign country’s
inability to handle complex cases, both because of laws geared toward the
226
resolution of individual disputes and because of the lack of financial resources.
Of relevance to future attempts to recognize and enforce a foreign money
judgment, plaintiffs argued that the foreign courts were inadequate because they
227
were corrupt and politicized. At the time the DBCP and Lago Agrio defendants
argued for an FNC dismissal, and therefore “praised” the foreign judiciaries as
228
adequate, “courts in those countries were known to be corrupt.” A number of

218. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1456; Heiser, supra note 1, at 614.
219. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1456–60.
220. Davies, supra note 142, at 319–20; see Whytock and Robertson, supra note 1, at 1456–60.
221. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981).
222. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254.
223. Garro, supra note 144, at 65.
224. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254–55, 255 n.22. In a an action based upon an aircraft crash that killed several
people, the Court held that the courts of Scotland were adequate even though Scotland does not recognize strict
liability and limits the type of recovery for wrongful death. Id. at 240, 254–55. By way of contrast, the Court
cited Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., where the district court refused to dismiss because it was
unclear whether Ecuadoran courts would hear the case and because Ecuador offered no remedy for the unjust
enrichment and tort claims asserted. Id. at 254–255 n.22 (citing 78 F.R.D. 445 (Del. 1978)).
225. E.g., Todd, supra note 88, at 300–03.
226. E.g., id. at 302–03.
227. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1457.
228. Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 10–11; see id. at 13 (“Many of Latin America’s judiciaries have
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factors contributed to this, such as low pay for judges and the possibility of the
judge’s removal at the political whim of the executive. A complaint directed at
courts and judges in many Latin American countries in the 1980s was corruption,
“‘political intervention, the failure to protect basic human rights and outright
229
collusion with authoritarian governments.’” The two countries at issue in this
Article, Nicaragua and Ecuador, “rank among the judiciaries with the most
230
corruption.” Both Nicaragua and Ecuador “are among a group of countries
231
where corruption has worsened as populist regimes politicized the judiciaries.”
Especially in highly publicized cases in which the government has a stake, the
judiciary in countries like Ecuador and Nicaragua “are vulnerable to the pressure
232
exerted by the Executive branch.”
Despite reports by scholars, the US State Department, various nongovernmental organizations, and the mass media of judicial corruption and
politicization, US courts hesitated to declare the judicial systems of other
countries inadequate. They either refused to inquire into these aspects of the
judiciary, or they applied only minimal scrutiny to ascertain whether corruption
would preclude fair proceedings for the individual plaintiffs, thereby rejecting
233
general accusations of corruption. For example, in Delgado v. Shell Oil Co.,
Judge Sim Lake downplayed plaintiffs’ affidavit and media reports about a
political dispute between the President and legislature of Nicaragua over the
appointment of Nicaraguan Supreme Court justices because that dispute had been
234
resolved and did not demonstrate a problem with the trial courts. In the Lago
Agrio plaintiffs’ first attempt at a US trial, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., Judge Jed
Rakoff rejected plaintiffs’ expert affidavit and Country Reports about Ecuador
because they contained “broad, conclusory assertions as to the relative
corruptibility or incorruptibility of the Ecuadorian courts, with scant reference to
235
specifics, evidence, or application to the instant cases.”

long had reputations among their own citizens as corrupt and subject to political influence.”); Whytock &
Robertson, supra note 1, at 1485 (“In the Dole case, the plaintiffs agreed that the Nicaraguan judiciary was
highly politicized, but emphasized that the defendants had certainly known about the issue at the time it sought
to dismiss the case in favor of a Nicaraguan forum.”); Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 44–46 (noting that
even though U.S. courts in the Aguinda litigation had concerns as far back as 2000, the representations of
Texaco “were sufficient to convince two U.S. courts to dismiss the litigation…”); see also Fitt, supra note 2, at
1038 (“stating that “[q]uantitative evidence has also confirmed” corruption in many Latin American countries).
229. Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 13 (quoting Linn Hammergren, Fighting Judicial Corruption: A
Comparative Perspective from Latin America, in Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial
Systems 138 (2007), available at www.transparency.org/publication/gcr/gcr2007).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Garro, supra note 144, at 84–85.
233. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1458–59; Heiser, supra note 1, at 616: Davies, supra note
142, at 354–56 (writing how courts are entitled to rely upon a broad range of sources in the FNC analysis).
234. 890 F. Supp. at 1357.
235. 142 F. Supp. 2d at 538, 544–45.
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With a low threshold for proving availability and adequacy, and with the
public and private interest factors leaning toward the foreign country, courts
236
routinely granted dismissal.
Dismissal was outcome determinative in
defendant’s favor, with cases sometimes not even refiled, and settlements only a
237
fraction of what they would have been in the U.S. This started to change
around the turn of the century. The foreign countries passed retaliatory
238
legislation. Some statutes, including those enacted in both Nicaragua and
Ecuador, empowered the courts to entertain the tort cases brought by their
citizens by including choice-of-law provisions that provided US-style procedural
and evidentiary mechanisms, added strict liability, and increased damages to a
239
level comparable to recoveries in the U.S. In addition to these retaliatory
statutes, “a growing number of countries are recognizing aggregate litigation and
moving away from prohibitions on contingency fee arrangements and punitive
240
damages. . . .” Also, there has been an increasing availability of third-party
241
litigation financing.
Plaintiffs who had originally filed in the U.S. but had their cases dismissed
for trial in their home countries are now returning—sometimes to the same court
242
that entered dismissal—for recognition and enforcement of judgments. They
find that the exact same evidence that they offered to show systemic corruption
and politicization, which the US courts held was irrelevant in the decision to
dismiss for FNC, has now become determinative in the decision not to recognize
243
and enforce their judgments. The fact that the same court relying upon the same
evidence can reach a different conclusion about adequacy is not inconsistent. In
contrast to FNC, the systemic inadequacy standard for recognition and
244
enforcement is “stricter, defendant-focused, and ex-post.” According to many
commentators, however, consistency does not equal justice; in fact, the
interaction of these two doctrines violates the principle of corrective justice that
236. Heiser, supra note 1, at 619.
237. Todd, supra note 88, at 304; Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated?—The
Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 184 (2000); see Baker & Parise,
supra note 5, at 9 (“The eventual enforcement of a foreign judgment was always a possibility implicit in the
dismissals for FNC, but that result rarely occurred.”).
238. Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 5–6.
239. Todd, supra note 88, at 307–10; Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 5–6; Heiser, supra note 1, at 622,
628–34; Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 502–03. See generally Garro, supra note 144; Anderson, supra
note 237.
240. Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in Transnational
Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 35 (2011) (citing
Mark A. Behrens, Gregory L. Fowler & Silvia Kim, Global Litigation Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165,
193–94 (2009)).
241. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litigation, 44
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159, 161 (2011).
227. Casey & Ristroph, supra note 10, at 21–22.
243. Id.
244. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1449–50.
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245

for every violation of a right, there must be a remedy. Countries that are not
dictatorships but that have a judiciary dominated by the legislative or executive
branches (including many Latin American countries) offer enough due process to
246
dismiss for FNC but not enough to enforce judgments.
Critics have
characterized the result of this collision between two different standards as a
247
loophole for defendants and as an “access-to-justice” gap for plaintiffs.
C. Proposed Solutions for the Systemic Inadequacy Ground
For cases that had previously been dismissed from the U.S., many
commentators have recommended changes to the FNC analysis to avoid the need
248
for enforcement and the potential for nonrecognition. Changing FNC will not
answer the multi-billion-dollar question, though, which is what to do about
foreign money judgments already awarded, such as to the judgment debtors in
the DBCP and Lago Agrio cases. Changes to FNC will have a declining impact
because the last several years have seen fewer alienage filings in US federal
district courts, and a corresponding increase in judgment debtors seeking
249
recognition of their foreign money judgments in the U.S.
At the enforcement stage of cases previously dismissed from the U.S.,
another suggestion is to judicially estop the judgment debtors from challenging
250
systemic inadequacy. This suggestion suffers from several shortcomings,
particularly with the Nicaraguan cases that proceeded pursuant to retaliatory
251
legislation that was enacted after the cases were dismissed from the U.S. Nor

245. Id. at 1482.
246. Casey & Ristroph, supra note 10, at 46–47.
247. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1481; Casey & Ristroph, supra note 10, at 44; see generally
Weston, supra note 7. Other criticisms include the costs and lack of efficiency for multiple proceedings instead
of a single trial; the lack of finality because of the potential for decades-long litigation; reliance on the part of
plaintiffs that defendants will recognize the adequacy of the foreign forum; the lessening of tort liability as a
deterrent to harmful conduct; and harm to comity and international relations. Whytock & Robertson, supra note
1, at 1482–91.
248. Robertson, supra note 207, at 1087 (federal legislation and treaties); Kenney, supra note 7, at 865
(more aggressive dismissal conditions on defendants); Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 30–31 (apply the law of
the foreign forum in the US proceedings). But see Jennifer L. Woulfe, Note, Where Forum Non Conveniens and
Preemptive Jurisdiction Collide: An Analytical Look at Latin American Preemptive Jurisdiction Laws in the
United States, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 171 (2010) (advocating that courts retain current FNC standards).
249. Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 224, at 33–37 (detailing the decline in alienage filings in US
federal courts in the 1990s and 2000s and concurrent increase in actions for the enforcement of foreign money
judgments in the Southern District of New York); see also Casey & Ristroph, supra note 10, at 51 (“As
plaintiffs achieve victories in Latin American courts, more judgment enforcement cases are likely to find their
way to U.S. courts.”).
250. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1500–01; Heiser, supra note 1, at 641–42.
251. E.g., Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1500-01; Heiser, supra note 1, at 660–61; see id. at
641–42 (writing that judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the courts and the judicial process by preventing a
party who has successfully asserted a position in a prior legal proceeding from taking a contrary position in a
later proceeding).
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should equitable relief be available for plaintiffs who themselves and through
their attorneys had a hand in drafting and procuring that retaliatory legislation,
and who have taken an active role in applying political pressure to the foreign
252
courts. Plus, as noted above, an increasing number of foreign plaintiffs are
turning first to their own courts, so estoppel would not apply to their attempts to
enforce.
While one obvious solution would seem to be legislation at the federal level
to unify recognition and enforcement practice, that option is not available for a
host of Constitutional reasons. Further, treaty negotiations have failed to result in
an international standard for recognition and enforcement that could override
253
state law. However, the systemic inadequacy ground may be unlawful under
the United States Constitution because of the separation of powers, so some
254
commentators propose eliminating the ground altogether.
The 2005
Recognition Act, which a growing number of states have enacted, added two
discretionary grounds for nonrecognition if the specific proceedings in the
255
foreign country denied due process or were tainted by judicial corruption. Not
only does this inquiry provide a more focused standard, it also vitiates the need
256
for an amorphous systemic inadequacy inquiry.
Because recognition and enforcement are a patchwork of state laws, the
states’ legislatures may not outright repeal this ground; nevertheless, the courts
and other governmental entities can minimize it. The courts could more readily
apply the act of state and political question doctrines to abstain from considering
257
the ground altogether. Additionally, the US Department of State could remove
the political question from the courts by creating an authoritative list of the
countries it believes have corrupt judiciaries that deny due process, making the
258
determination an easy call.

252. Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 489–512 (detailing how plaintiffs and their attorneys in the
DBCP and Lago Agrio litigation have met ex parte with judges, enlisted the aid of the executive branch, staged
mass protests in the capital cities, and helped to draft and enact the retaliatory legislation); see, e.g., James F.
Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Minamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1193, 1243 (2006) (“The equitable maxims of ‘unclean hands,’ ‘equity favors the
vigilant,’ and ‘he who seeks equity must do equity,’ all focus on the movant’s role and may disqualify him from
relief if his conduct was responsible for the harm.”).
253. See generally Gul, supra note 5.
254. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1165; Kelly, supra note 2, at 582.
255. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1233–36.
256. Id.; see Kelly, supra note 2, at 576–77.
257. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1190–91; Kelly, supra note 2, at 582.
258. See Carodine, supra note 3, at 1165; Kelly, supra note 2, at 582 (recommending that the US State
Department could make its Country Reports less reliable as evidence by including disclaimers in them).
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IV. SYSTEMIC INADEQUACY AS APPLIED: THE DBCP AND LAGO AGRIO
LITIGATION AND THE AVOIDANCE OF THIS GROUND
Mootz writes that “law is never understood abstractly but only in reference to
259
its application to a specific case.” Accordingly, this Article turns to the
systemic inadequacy ground as it has been applied in two recent cases, which
have received considerable attention from scholars who theorize that systemic
inadequacy unfairly denies plaintiffs access to justice. An analysis of the cases
proves that this ground has had no impact on the recognition of the DBCP or
Lago Agrio judgments. There has been a lack of justice, however, because the
circuit courts have rejected the district court’s application of this ground, but
260
have done so without sound reasons. The appellate courts have either ignored
their own standards and precedent, or have twisted the readings of cases and
261
statutes.
A. DBCP Litigation and Attempted Enforcement of a Nicaraguan Judgment in
Osorio v. Dole Food Company
1. Background on DBCP Litigation in the 1980s and 1990s
Scholars, the mass media, and the director of not one but two films have told
262
and retold the story of DBCP litigation for over twenty years. It begins with the
nematode, a worm so small one needs a microscope to see it. It attacks the roots
263
of crops and causes significant damage. DBCP is the active ingredient in

259. Mootz, supra note 13, at 577.
260. See Parts IV.A.3–4 and IV.B.3-4
261. Id.
262. This author published an article on this topic twenty years after one of his law school professors
published the first. Compare Todd, supra note 88, with Alex Wilson Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A
Confused and Inappropriate Substitute for Forum Non Convemens, 71 TEX. L. REV. 351 (1992). DBCP
litigation in Los Angeles County made the front page of the Wall Street Journal a few years ago, continuing a
trend started in the mid-1990s in the New York Times. Steve Stecklow, Fraud by Trial Lawyers Taints Wave of
Pesticide Lawsuits, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 19, 2009), http://online.wsj. com/article/SB125061508138
340501.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Diana Jean Schemo, U.S. Pesticide Kills Foreign Fruit
Pickers’ Hopes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/06/ world/us-pesticide-killsforeign-fruit-pickers-hopes.html. (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). For an analysis of the perceptions of
plaintiffs in media coverage about DBCP litigation, see Anne Bloom, “Milking the Cash Cow” and Other
Stories: Media Coverage of Transnational Workers’ Rights Litigation, 30 VT. L. REV. 179, 190–196 (2006).
Fredrick Gertten directed the documentary Bananas!* that covered the trial in Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC
312852 (L.A. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2008). See BANANAS!*, http://www. bananasthemovie.com (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). Dole sued Gertten for defamation after the film was screened at the Los Angeles Film
Festival, but then dismissed the suit. Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 492–93, 493 n.193. Gertten has
subsequently made another documentary about that defamation lawsuit, Big Boys Gone Bananas!*.; BIG BOYS
GONE BANANAS!*, http://www.bigboysgonebananas.com (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).;
263. Sharon Frey, Comment, DBCP: A Lesson in Groundwater Management, 5 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 81, 81 (1985).
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nematocides that controlled the pest effectively and resulted in larger crop
264
yields. DBCP was used on a variety of crops throughout the world, but its use
on banana farms in the Philippines, West Africa, and Latin America—in
265
particular, Nicaragua in the 1970s—generated the most lawsuits. After the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency canceled the registration for DBCP in 1979
because significant exposure to the chemical can cause sterility in men, foreign
field workers started filing lawsuits in the United States against the
manufacturers of the pesticide and the major fruit companies that had contracted
266
with the farms where they worked.
As the example of Delgado shows, these lawsuits did not make it far in the
267
U.S. because they were routinely dismissed on FNC grounds. For many of
these lawsuits, dismissal was outcome determinative; many actions were never
268
refiled in the home country, and even those that were did not make it to trial. At
best, plaintiffs could settle their claims, but only for a fraction of what they could
269
have received in U.S. litigation. Several Latin American countries responded
with blocking statutes, some of which were specifically enacted in response to
DBCP litigation. Nicaragua’s blocking statute, Special Law 364, caused the
270
largest impact. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, in conjunction with a “union” of banana
farm workers affected by DBCP, helped draft Special Law 364 and then lobbied
271
the Nicaraguan legislature to pass it. It aimed to coerce defendants into not
seeking an FNC dismissal through the irony of proclaiming the courts of
Nicaragua open to DBCP litigation—but with conditions so onerous that no
272
defendant would choose Nicaragua over the U.S. Among other provisions, this
retroactive law required the posting of millions of dollars of bonds to litigate; it
made strict liability available by creating an irrefutable presumption of causation
for any plaintiff who could show exposure and sterility; it curtailed proceedings
so that defendants had only three days to answer the complaint and eight days for

264. See id.
265. Todd, supra note 88, at 297–98
266. Id. at 298; see, e.g., Delgado, 231 F.3d 165 at 165, 169–170; Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, 786
S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1990) (stating that Costa Rican plaintiffs asserted claims against Dow and Shell); Sibaja
v. Dow Chemical Co., 757 F. 2d 1215, 1216 (11th Cir. 1985) (same).
267. Todd, supra 88, at 300; see also 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (1995).
252. See Todd, supra note 88, at 304; Dante Figueroa, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the United States
and Latin America in the Context of Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 119,
153 (2005).
269. Id.; Anderson, supra note 248, at 184.
270. The formal title of Special Law 364 is Special Law for the Conduct of Lawsuits Filed by Persons
Affected by the Use of Pesticides Manufactured with a DBCP Base. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1353–55, app. I.
An English translation of Special Law 364 is attached as an appendix in Osorio. Id.,
271. Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 490.
272. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1325 (citing Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America
and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 24 (2003–04)).
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discovery; and it established a schedule of damages, with $100,000 U.S. as the
273
minimum.
While one purpose was to prevent lawsuits pending in the U.S. from being
dismissed to Nicaragua, Special Law 364 had provisions that nevertheless
encouraged new plaintiffs to file claims in Nicaragua, which they did. Within a
274
few years of passage, 7,000 plaintiffs filed over four hundred cases. By 2009,
Nicaraguan courts had rendered thirty-two judgments totaling over $2 billion,
275
with claims for billions more pending. Because those defendants no longer
have assets in Nicaragua, the plaintiffs sought to recognize and enforce one of
those judgments in the U.S., including one proceeding where the courts
276
considered the systemic inadequacy ground: Osorio v. Dole Food Co. Two
hundred and one plaintiffs filed the underlying lawsuit in Osorio pursuant to
277
Special Law 364 in February 2002 in Chinandega, Nicaragua. The plaintiffs
asserted that, during their work on Dole-contracted banana farms in the 1970s,
278
they were exposed to DBCP manufactured by Dow, Shell, and Occidental. In
2005, the trial court entered judgment in favor of 150 of the 201 plaintiffs,
279
awarding a total of $97.4 million, or an average award of $647, 000.
2. The District Court Denies Enforcement
The prevailing plaintiffs sought recognition in the Circuit Court of MiamiDade County in August 2007, but the defendants removed to the Federal District
280
Court for the Southern District of Florida. Florida’s Recognition Act tracks the
1962 Act except that it includes reciprocity and has a separate provision for
281
defamation actions.

273. Id. at 1353–55; see also Heiser, supra note 1, at 631–33.
274. Todd, supra note 88, at 331–12; see also Heiser, supra note 1, at 633 (“[T]he provisions that remove
financial barriers to suit by plaintiffs in Nicaragua by authorizing free legal assistance and waiver of costs, as
well as the provisions dealing with causation and damages, appear designed to encourage Nicaraguan plaintiffs
to commence their lawsuits in the Nicaraguan courts.”).
275. Todd, supra note 8, at 312.
276. 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307; see id. at 1312 (“Dole used DBCP on its banana farms in Nicaragua until the
farms were expropriated by the Sandinista regime that came to power in 1979.”) Another group of Nicaraguan
judgment creditors had sought recognition and enforcement in California of a $489.4 million judgment rendered
under Special Law 364, but recognition was denied on other grounds, so no trial or appellate court addressed
systemic inadequacy. Franco v. The Dow Chemical Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26639, Case No. CV 03-5094
NM (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2003); Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, 2005 WL 6184247, No. CV 03 8846 NM at *2
(PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005).
277. 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. None of the plaintiffs were parties to the Delgado litigation.
278. Id. at 1311–12. Judge Huck had earlier dismissed Occidental and Shell from the lawsuit because
they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nicaragua. Id. at 1311 n.1.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1321.
281. FLA. STAT. § 55.605 (West 2006).
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The remaining judgment debtors, Dole and Dow, argued that the court should
not enforce the judgment because:
(1) the Nicaraguan trial court lacked personal and subject matter
jurisdiction over the Defendants, (2) the underlying judgment was
rendered under a system which does not provide procedures compatible
with the international concept of due process of law, (3) the cause of
action or claim of relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to
the public policy of the State of Florida, and (4) the judgment was
282
rendered under a system without impartial tribunals.
In their first argument, the defendants combined two different mandatory
grounds for nonrecognition, the lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction,
283
into one. They approached the systemic inadequacy grounds similarly to
Professor Heiser’s interpretation of it as two separate considerations, with
argument (2) relating to due process and argument (4) relating to corruption and
284
politicization. The remaining argument, that the “cause of action or claim for
relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this
285
state,” is one of the discretionary grounds. After considering the evidence,
including a four-day hearing in which “[b]oth sides submitted substantial expert
testimony and documentary evidence. . . on the Nicaraguan judicial system,
Special Law 364, and the specific Nicaraguan trial proceedings in this case,”
286
Judge Huck found for Dole and Dow on all four grounds.
He treated each argument in turn. Of importance to personal and subject
matter jurisdiction, Special Law 364 requires the posting of a bond as a
“procedural prerequisite for being able to take part in the lawsuit,” and if
defendants do not do so within ninety days, they “must subject themselves
unconditionally to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States of
287
America.” The Supreme Court of Nicaragua affirmed the constitutionality of
this provision because it gave defendants the right to opt out of litigation in
288
Nicaragua and instead choose a U.S. forum. Because both Dole and Dow had
refused to post the bond, Judge Huck found that the defendants had “effectively

282. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321. Shell and Occidental had already been granted summary judgment
because they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nicaragua. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., No. 07-22693CIV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 713 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2009).
283. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321; see also FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(b)–(c).
284. Id. § 55.605(1)(a); Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321; see also Heiser, supra note 1, at 638–39.
285. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321; FLA. STAT. § 55.605(2)(c). Dole and Dow also asserted that the
judgment was obtained by fraud, but the trial court bifurcated the proceedings and reserved the fraud ground for
a later hearing if necessary. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1312, n.3; see FLA. STAT. § 55.605(2)(b).
286. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321–22.
287. Id. at 1326.
288. Consultation to the Judges of the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua, 53 (Nicar. Oct. 16, 2003).
A complete translation of the opinion is available in the Appendix to Saint Dahl, supra note 272, at 53–57.
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invoked their opt-out rights,” which divested the trial court of both personal and
subject matter jurisdiction and mandated nonrecognition under Section
289
55.605(1)(b)–(c). Judge Huck devoted a significant portion of his analysis to
290
the due process aspect of Section 55.605(1)(a). Rather than look at whether the
Nicaraguan judiciary as a whole provides procedures that are fundamentally fair,
the court evaluated only the provisions of Special Law 364, the only theory of
291
liability upon which the underlying judgment was based. After summarizing
the medical and scientific evidence about DBCP and sterility, Judge Huck
concluded that “the international due process norms described in Ashenden do
not permit awarding damages, especially of the magnitude awarded here, without
292
proof of causation.” He also examined the other provisions of Special Law 364
and concluded that, both on their face and as applied by the Nicaraguan trial
court, they unfairly targeted certain foreign defendants and thereby denied them
293
due process. The court limited its analysis of the public policy ground “to
Defendants’ challenges to the portions of Special Law 364 which the Court has
already concluded are inconsistent with the international concept of due
294
process.” For the same reasons that these provisions failed to comport with the
international standard, they deprived defendants of due process under Florida’s
Constitution, thus supporting nonrecognition under the discretionary ground of
295
section 55.605(2)(c).
The court concluded by analyzing the impartiality of the Nicaraguan
judiciary, the other consideration for mandatory nonrecognition under section
296
55.605(1)(a). The court relied upon the United States Department of State
Country Reports from 1999 through 2008, which “have concluded that Nicaragua
297
lacks an effective civil law system.” Osorio was filed in Nicaragua in 2002, and
that same year the State Department concluded that “‘[j]udge’s political
sympathies, acceptance of bribes, or influence from political leaders reportedly
298
often influenced judicial actions and findings.” And in 2005, the year that the
Osorio judgment was issued, the State Department suggested that the situation
had deteriorated because they used the same language from 2002 but dropped the
299
“reportedly.” The court turned to other sources that seconded the Country

289. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1326 (citing FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(b)–(c)).
290. See generally Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307.
291. Id. at 1343.
292. Id. at 1335.
293. Id. at 1335–43.
294. Id. at 1345.
295. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law . . . .”), § 21 (“[J]ustice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”)), id. at 1347.
296. Id. at 1347–48.
297. Id. at 1348.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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Reports, like the reports of non-governmental organizations, to find “that the
unanimous view among United States government organizations and officials
(including United States ambassadors to Nicaragua), foreign governments,
international organizations, and credible Nicaraguan authorities, is that the
judicial branch in Nicaragua is dominated by political forces and, in general, does
300
not dispense impartial justice.”
The court found that two of defendants’ experts on the Nicaraguan judiciary
were well-qualified and their testimony was especially credible. The first was
Omar Garcia-Bolivar, a Latin American specialist who served as part of the
United States Agency for International Development’s assessment process under
the Central American Free Trade Agreement. The second was Gabriel Antonio
301
Alvarez Arguello, a Nicaraguan lawyer and law professor. Garcia-Bolivar
testified that politicians regularly determined the outcome of trials and that lower
court judges are subject to the political whim of Supreme Court justices, who run
302
their judicial districts like “fiefdoms.” Professor Alvarez testified that, while
the formal structure of the judiciary is respectable on paper, “in practice its
303
decisions are commonly driven by partisan interests.” Plaintiffs’ experts did not
rebut the conclusions of these experts and the other independent evidence of
304
corruption and politicization.
Like the judiciary of Liberia, which was described in Bridgeway, the
judiciary of Nicaragua ignored the national constitution, and “‘corruption and
305
incompetent handling of cases were prevalent.’” Consistent with the approach
of other courts, the court based its conclusion on “the operation of the
306
Nicaraguan judicial system as a whole, and not the particulars of this case.”
The court nevertheless called Special Law 364 and its application to the case
307
“Exhibit A evidencing the lack of independent tribunals in Nicaragua.”
The passage of Special Law 364 is itself evidence of political interference in
Nicaragua’s judicial process. The law requires judges to enforce a set of
procedures that the Nicaraguan Attorney General found were unconstitutional;
indeed, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court upheld Special Law 364 only because the
308
defendants could voluntarily exempt themselves from it.
Based on the mandatory grounds, Judge Huck concluded that “the judgment
is not considered conclusive, and cannot be enforced under the Florida

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
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Id. at 1348–49.
Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1349–50.
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1350.
Id.
Id. at 1349 (citing 45 F. Supp. 2d at 287).
Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
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Recognition Act.” He likewise declined to enforce the judgment on the public
policy ground, and ordered that the judgment “be neither recognized nor
310
enforced.”
3. The Eleventh Circuit Affirms—Except for the Holding on Systemic
Inadequacy
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding that the Nicaraguan judgment was not entitled to recognition and
311
enforcement.
It did so only on the grounds of lack of personal and subject
matter jurisdiction, lack of due process, and repugnance to the public policy of
312
Florida. The Eleventh Circuit wrote that “we do not address the broader issue
of whether Nicaragua as a whole ‘does not provide impartial tribunals’ and
313
decline to adopt the district court’s holding on that question.”
4. Rhetorical Analysis of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion—Or, More
Precisely, What the Court Does Not Say
The brevity of the above summary suggests the shortcoming of the Eleventh
Circuit’s opinion: that quote constitutes the extent of the Court’s writing on this
314
point. To paraphrase James Boyd White, judges tend to exclude that which
does not lead to certainty in results, so the rhetorical critic asks what voices were
315
silenced. Here, those voices were other judicial opinions, even those of the
Eleventh Circuit. The court did not cite any authority to justify its refusal to
affirm this ground, not even a standard of review—indeed, it offered no
316
explanation or rationale at all.
Yet rhetoricians measure the justice of an
opinion by the explicit justifications in that opinion: the judge needs to
demonstrate how the holding is supported by established rules of law and that it
317
does not contradict them. The Eleventh Circuit’s reversal of the systemic
inadequacy finding is inconsistent with other authority because the legal
interpretations and factual findings made by Judge Huck comport with the
318
leading cases and the scholarly comment on the systemic inadequacy ground.
To maintain its preferred holding, the court therefore had to ignore authority

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 1352.
Id.
Osorio v. Dow Chemical Co., 635 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1278–79.
Id. at 1279.
Id.
See White, supra note 15, at 695.
See id.; Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279.
See, e.g., Mootz, supra note 15, at 571.
See supra Part III.A.2.
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because all of it is to the contrary. Instead of offering persuasive reasons, the
320
court relied upon its position of power to force the holding. Even though the
judgment was affirmed because of the other three grounds, the court’s refusal to
cite and adhere to authority calls into question the legitimacy of the opinion and
321
thereby diminishes the rule of law.
322
The Eleventh Circuit does not identify the error or errors of the trial court.
Was there an error of law? Of fact? Both? After all, the systemic inadequacy
323
inquiry involves considerations of both law and fact. Nor does the court even
articulate a standard of review, particularly one that allows it to reject a trial
324
court’s holding without addressing why. The parties and anyone who reads the
opinion are left to speculate. So let us engage in that speculation and take as our
starting point the standards of review in the Eleventh Circuit. The Circuit Court
of Appeals reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and
325
applies the same legal standards that controlled the district court’s decision.
Accordingly, the court reviews the district court’s interpretation and application
326
of the law de novo. That the court declined to adopt Judge Huck’s “holding”
327
suggests an error of law. An analysis of his opinion shows that there was no
328
such error.
Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts apply the law of the state in which
they sit to determine whether to recognize and enforce a foreign money
329
judgment. Judge Huck applied the Florida Recognition Act, including its
provision mandating as inconclusive a judgment rendered under a system with
330
impartial tribunals. Because it cited to the Florida Recognition Act provisions
in affirming the findings about lack of due process, lack of personal and subject
matter jurisdiction, and violation of public policy, the Eleventh Circuit must
331
agree that Judge Huck applied the correct statutory law.
Perhaps the legal error was in splitting this first ground into two different
considerations. Courts and scholars, including Professor Heiser (to whom Judge

319. The one exception would be if it had cited either act of state or political question doctrine as raised
by Carodine, see discussion accompanying notes 174–182, supra, but that would have entailed taking a risk as
opposed to playing it safe. See infra Part V.
320. Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279.
321. See discussion accompanying supra notes 56–61,
322. Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279.
323. See Soc’y of Lloyds, 233 F.3d at 477.
324. Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279.
325. Billings v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 459 F.3d 1088, 1092 (11th Cir. 2006).
326. Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 425 F.3d 1325, 1336 (11th Cir. 2005).
327. Osorio, 635 F.3d, at 1279.
328. See generally 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
329. See, e.g., Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 265 n.129.
330. Osorio, 635 F.3d, at 1322–23 (citing FLA. STAT. § 55.605).
331. Id. at 1278 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 55.605).
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Huck cites), approach this ground the same way. When it listed the “four
independent grounds for nonrecognition under the Act,” the Eleventh Circuit
333
easily could have pointed out that two of them should have been treated as one.
This error would be harmless, however, because the plain language of the Florida
Recognition Act itself allows for two considerations: “a system which does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
334
due process of law.” That Judge Huck treated these considerations in separate
places in the opinion seems irrelevant.
A more serious legal error might be his interpretation of what a “system with
335
impartial tribunals” means under the Florida Recognition Act. No Florida
opinions have interpreted this ground. Judge Huck cited only one opinion,
Bridgeway, and characterized the ground as mandating generalizations about the
336
Nicaraguan judiciary as a whole. That interpretation was articulated in
Ashenden, has been followed by numerous courts, and is recognized by
337
scholars. Maybe the Eleventh Circuit desired a break with other courts and
thought that the standard should be more focused on impartiality in the particular
proceedings. Nothing in Florida case law suggests that its Recognition Act
should be interpreted differently than other jurisdictions’ Recognition Acts. In
fact, at least one Florida court cited the Recognition Act of another state and
338
characterized it as “the same.” Even so, Judge Huck did actually address
339
impartiality in the particular proceedings.
Another possible legal error relates to the sources of proof relied upon to
establish the impartiality of the Nicaraguan judiciary. Judge Huck cited the
written and oral opinions of two experts, who themselves attached numerous
legal and media sources. He also cited the U.S. State Department Country
340
Reports on Nicaragua as well as the reports of other organizations. These are
the types of sources that other federal courts have cited in addressing systemic
inadequacy, and such sources are specifically allowed under Federal Rule of
341
Civil Procedure 44.1 and Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C).

332. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, Case No. CV 03-8846 NM (PJWx), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31125
at *2, *17 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2004) (considering California’s section 1713(a)(1) in a motion for summary
judgment), which mirrors Florida’s section 55.605(1)(a), as a claim for lack of impartial tribunals and a claim
for lack of due process; Heiser, supra note 1, at 638–39; Kelly, supra note 2, at 563; Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at
1325 (citing Heiser, supra note 1, at 622–23).
333. Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1278.
334. FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(a) (emphasis added).
335. See Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1349.
336. Id. (citing 45 F. Supp. 2d at 287).
337. See discussion accompanying supra notes 138–140.
338. Israel v. Flick Mortg. Investors, Inc., 23 So. 3d 1196, 1198 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2008)
(citing the Texas Recognition Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 36.001–008).
339. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
340. Id. at 1348–50.
341. See supra notes 163-173; see also Franco, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31125 at *13–14 (in motion to
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Rather than the types of sources, the error might be the sufficiency of those
sources to support the conclusion of systemic inadequacy. Of course, this is more
speculation because the court did not detail the evidence relevant to the point or
342
explain how—or even if—the finding was factually insufficient. The Eleventh
343
Circuit reviews findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. “The law is
well settled that ‘[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in
light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it
even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have
344
weighed the evidence differently.’” Even if the evidence conflicts, the appellate
345
court may not reverse. Indeed, where the court credited the testimony of one of
two or more witnesses who told equally coherent and plausible stories, that
346
finding “can virtually never be clear error.” Under this deferential standard, the
appellate court could not have found error. Judge Huck had the opinions of two
experts, themselves supported by numerous legal and media sources, about
347
impartiality in Nicaragua. Plaintiffs too brought forward expert testimony,
348
which he considered but rejected. Multiple years’ Country Reports, bolstered
by the reports of other entities, supported judicial politicization and corruption
349
during the years that Osorio was tried in Nicaragua. This equals, if not exceeds,
the volume of information considered by federal courts that have found a system
350
of impartial tribunals in the foreign country.
Rather than persuade through reason, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon its
power in the federal judicial hierarchy to gain adherence. The opinion was not
authored and signed by a single judge, but was instead per curiam, which is the
corporate “we” of the entire court. Only an appellate court can issue an opinion
that speaks with the voice of the entire court—but then it should do so only when
351
the matter is clear. The opinion therefore enjoys its authority through force
rather than through persuasion, because the Eleventh Circuit did not have to
justify itself to the inferior court, which has no basis to question the negation of
dismiss, referring to statements by US Ambassador to Nicaragua and in US State Department reports about
bribery, corruption, and politicization of the judiciary in Nicaragua).
342. See 5 AM. JUR. 2D APPELLATE REVIEW § 773.
343. Billings, 459 F.3d at 1092 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
344. Holton, 425 F.3d at 1354 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
345. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
346. Id. at 575.
347. Id. at 1349–50.
348. Id. at 1350–51.
349. Id. at 1348–50.
350. See, e.g., Bridgeway, 201 F.3d at 141–42 (affirming finding based upon affidavits of one person and
several years’ worth of US State Department Country Reports that Liberia lacked a system that provided
impartial tribunals).
351. Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 409 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Per curiam is a Latin phrase
meaning ‘[b]y the court’, which should distinguish an opinion of the whole Court from an opinion written by
any one Justice. . . . Such an opinion does not speak for the entire Court on a matter so clear that the Court can
and should speak with one voice.”).
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its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the judgment was affirmed
on two other mandatory grounds and one discretionary ground, plaintiffs had
reason to seek Supreme Court review only on those three, and Dole had no
353
reason to challenge the rejected holding.
B. Lago Agrio Litigation and Chevron’s Suit to Have an Ecuadoran Judgment
Declared Unenforceable
As with the tale of DBCP litigation, scholars, the mass media, and even one
354
filmmaker have chronicled the Lago Agrio saga. Based on the sheer volume of
judicial opinions alone, the Second Circuit wrote, “The story of the conflict
between Chevron and residents of the Lago Agrio region of the Ecuadorian
Amazon must be among the most extensively told in the history of the American
355
federal judiciary.” The attempts to tell the story have become part of the
litigation itself, with Chevron gaining access to over six hundred hours of
outtakes from the movie Crude, outtakes that formed part of the basis for the
district court to enter a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the $17.2
356
billion Ecuadorean judgment. In vacating the injunction, the Second Circuit
ignored these outtakes, and all of the evidence submitted by Chevron, and the
other cases on point, and instead relied upon an unprincipled reading of New
357
York’s Recognition Act to hold that equitable relief was not an option.

352. See Levinson, supra note 49, at 195.
353. Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 S. Ct. 1045 (2012) (denying plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari).
354. One could potentially write a lengthy bibliography just on Aguinda and Donziger, but a good
example of the scholarly interest in this litigation is Dhooge, who published separate articles on the potential
nonrecognition based the mandatory and on the discretionary grounds. See generally Dhooge Mandatory, supra
note 11 (citing the most recent scholarship on this topic). This litigation has been featured in two general
interest magazines. Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/09/120109fa_fact_keefe (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); William Langewiesche, Jungle Law, VANITY FAIR (May 2007), http://www.vanityfair. com/politics/
features/2007/05/texaco200705 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Joe
Berlinger directed the documentary Crude, which focuses on plaintiffs’ attorneys, Stephen Donziger and Pablo
Fajardo, and their involvement in the proceedings in Ecuador. The movie streams on Netflix, and the production
notes for the movie are online. Production Notes, CRUDE, available at http://www.crudethemovie.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2009/08/CRUDE-Press-Kit-081909.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Id.;
Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 236.
355. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234.
356. Id. at 236–37. For one commentator’s discussion of the filmmaker’s privilege relating to Chevron’s
discovery proceedings under 28 U.S.C.§ 1782, see Tom Isler, Comment, Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger and the
Future of the Journalists’ Privilege for Documentary Filmmakers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (2012).
357. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239, 246.
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1. Background: Texaco’s Operations in Ecuador, Plaintiffs’ Failed Attempt
at a US Lawsuit, and Their Success in Ecuadoran Courts
Texaco Petroleum Company (TexPet), a subsidiary of Texaco, began oil
exploration in Ecuador in 1964, and in 1965 it started a petroleum concession for
358
a consortium that it owned in equal shares with Gulf Coil Corporation. The
consortium eventually came to include the Republic of Ecuador itself, which
through its state-owned oil company Petroecuador acquired Gulf’s interests in
359
1974. In 1990, Petroecuador assumed TexPet’s operation of a trans-Ecuadoran
360
oil pipeline and drilling activities. TexPet relinquished its interests in the
consortium two years later, leaving Petroecuador as the sole owner and
361
operator.
As discussed above, plaintiffs brought a putative class action in the Southern
362
District of New York in 1993, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., and alleged that
Texaco, through the consortium, leaked oil from the pipeline, deliberately
363
sprayed oil on the roads, and stored petroleum wastes in open pits. These
actions led to the pollution of “the rain forests and rivers” as well as potential
364
adverse health effects to residents. The plaintiffs sought money damages as
well as equitable relief like funding for environmental remediation, renovating or
closing the trans-Ecuador pipeline, establishing standards for future oil
365
development, and medical monitoring. The court never addressed the merits of
the complaint: after two rounds of FNC proceedings, the trial court entered
366
dismissal and the Second Circuit affirmed.
As with the Nicaraguan DBCP cases, Aguinda did not die following
367
dismissal but was refiled in Ecuador in 2003. The suit went to trial under
Article 43 of an Ecuadoran law, legislation drafted and procured by Bonifaz and
368
other plaintiffs’ lawyers that was enacted in 1999. Like Special Law 364,
Article 43 provided the Ecuadorean courts with a vehicle to handle the

358. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 473. Another lawsuit was consolidated with Aguinda. Id. (citing Jota v.
Texaco, Inc., Dkt. No. 94 Civ. 9266 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 28, 1994)). Peruvians living downstream also brought
actions against Texaco that were consolidated with Aguinda. Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 536–37 (citing
Ashanga v. Texaco, Inc., 94 Civ. 9266).
363. 142 F. Supp. 2d 534; see Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
364. Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 473.
365. Id. at 473–74.
366. Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (citing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
reconsid. denied, 175 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998)); 142
F. Supp. 2d at 536, aff’d 303 F.3d at 472.
367. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
368. Id.
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complicated case and the plaintiffs with a shot to recover billions in damages.
Rather than a class action, it proceeded as something analogous to a citizen’s
attorney general suit, with the same named plaintiffs pursuing damages for
environmental remediation on behalf of Ecuador as well as compensation for
370
medical treatment. The defendant also changed: Chevron had acquired Texaco
371
in 2001, and the latter remains a wholly-owned subsidiary of Chevron. The
court-appointed neutral expert opined that the court should award $27 billion
(US) damages; the trial court instead entered judgment for approximately $8.6
billion, a figure that was doubled to $17.2 billion when Chevron declined to
apologize within two weeks of the judgment, as well as costs to the Amazon
372
Defense Front to administer the proceeds. Of note, the lion’s share of this
judgment goes directly to the government of Ecuador for remediation of
groundwater, drinking water, and soil, as well as damages to flora and fauna and
373
delivery of health care.
2. Chevron Seeks Preemptive Nonrecognition and a Worldwide Injunction,
Which the District Court Grants in Chevron Corp. v. Donziger
Chevron responded by itself filing a preemptive suit in the Southern District
of New York against the plaintiffs and their attorneys, alleging claims under the
Racketeering Included and Corrupt Practices Act; state tort claims including
fraud; state claims for civil conspiracy; violations of the New York Judiciary
Law by Donziger and his law firm; and “a declaratory judgment, pursuant to the
federal Declaratory Judgment Act, that the Lago Agrio judgment is not entitled to
374
recognition or enforcement in the United States or anywhere else.” Based on
outtakes from the movie Crude and computer files belonging to plaintiff’s
attorney Stephen Donziger that were gained from the Section 1782 actions,
Chevron sought a preliminary injunction to prevent plaintiffs and their attorneys
375
from having the judgment enforced anywhere in the world.
In the Second Circuit, “[a] party seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish irreparable harm and either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or
(b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships
376
tipping decidedly in its favor.” Judge Lewis A. Kaplan found that Chevron

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
2002)).

Id. at 599–600; see Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 502–03.
See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 600, 645.
Id. at 594 n.2.
Id. at 603 n.60, 620–21.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 625–26.
Id. at 594–95; Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234; see id. at 236–37 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782).
Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (quoting Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir.
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satisfied this standard. As to the immediate and irreparable injury, plaintiffs had
a worldwide strategy of pursuing multiple enforcement actions and asset
378
seizures, many of them ex parte. Statements by Donziger and the “Invictus”
memorandum prepared by the Patton Boggs law firm revealed that the plaintiffs
379
considered Chevron’s size its weakness. It operates in over one hundred
countries and has tankers that dock around the world, including in countries that
380
would be sympathetic to the plaintiffs. By attaching ships and seeking
enforcement, they could disrupt Chevron’s logistics and harass Chevron into
381
settling quickly rather than fighting a lengthy enforcement action in the U.S.
Plus, given that the plaintiffs are indigenous peoples in Ecuador, Chevron would
382
not be able to recover anything it paid if it were to prevail in the lawsuit.
Plaintiffs have declined to stipulate that they will not seek enforcement while
383
Chevron’s action is pending.
Judge Kaplan also found that Chevron would likely succeed on the merits of
its claims, namely that it could win a declaratory judgment that the foreign
judgment is not entitled to recognition and enforcement under New York’s
Recognition Act, which follows the 1962 Recognition Act with minor
384
differences.
Chevron argued two grounds for nonrecognition: systemic
385
inadequacy and fraud. While bound to apply New York law under the Erie
doctrine, Judge Kaplan noted that these two grounds are part of the Uniform
Recognition Acts adopted in most states and has been recognized in Hilton v.
386
Guyot and in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.
387
Judge Kaplan addressed the mandatory systemic inadequacy ground first.
Based in part on the expert report of Vladimiro Alvarez Grau, an attorney from
Ecuador who has held numerous elected and appointed public offices and legal
academic positions, he concluded that “[t]he Ecuadorian judiciary has been in a
state of severe institutional crisis for some time. Matters have deteriorated
388
recently.” Since the election of President Rafael Correa, the appointment and
389
removal of judges has been through political rather than constitutional means.
377. Id. at 592, 660.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 623.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 626–27.
382. Id. at 627.
383. Id. at 631; see Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ 0691 (LAK), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107693
* 101–02 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2012) (confirming that plaintiffs have made no meaningful statements that they
will not seek recognition and enforcement).
384. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 636, 637 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301 et seq.).
385. Id. at 632–33.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 632.
388. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 616, 616 n.163.
389. Id. at 617.
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In a number of recent cases, “judges have been threatened with violence,
removed, and/or prosecuted when they ruled against the government’s
390
interests.”
Public officials within Ecuador and numerous independent
commentators have concluded “that the rule of law is not respected in Ecuador in
391
cases that have become politicized.” And this case has become politicized: after
meeting with Donziger, President Correa visited the trial proceedings and
392
publicly announced his support of the plaintiffs.
Other sources of evidence were the reports of government and non393
governmental organizations.
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators showed that in 2009 Ecuador ranked in the bottom of the world with
394
respect to rule of law, behind even Liberia and North Korea. The State
Department’s Country Reports for the prior three years also showed that
Ecuadoran judges sometimes decided cases in response to outside pressure and
395
corruption. Judge Kaplan concluded that “there is abundant evidence before the
Court that Ecuador has not provided impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with due process of law, at least in the time period relevant here, especially in
396
cases such as this.”
Judge Kaplan also found that Chevron would likely be able to prove fraud in
397
the Ecuadoran proceedings. Of most significance, counsel for plaintiffs met
with the supposedly independent expert Cabrera before his appointment by the
court, made illicit payments to him, and ghost-wrote some if not all of his
398
damages assessment report. They did not notify the court of their involvement
399
and made misrepresentations about their relationship to the court. When the
Section 1782 proceedings threatened to reveal the relationship, they undertook to
“cleanse” the Cabrera report by hiring new consultants who wrote a new
400
assessment—based on the initial Cabrera report. Based on these findings, Judge
Kaplan entered the worldwide anti-enforcement preliminary injunction requested
401
by Chevron.

390. Id. at 618.
391. Id. at 619.
392. E.g., Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 507–08. Other evidence of political pressure includes
criminal charges that were brought, dropped, and then re-initiated against Chevron’s local counsel in Ecuador.
Id. at 508.
393. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 633.
397. Id. at 635–36
398. Id. at 636.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 660. Whether Chevron would be able to prevail also depended upon whether the court had
personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs and their counsel. Id. at 639. Judge Kaplan found that minimum contacts
was satisfied because the plaintiffs had previously filed suit in New York after retaining New York attorneys,
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3. The Second Circuit Reverses in Chevron Corp. v. Camacho Naranjo,
Rejecting Preemptive Nonrecognition Under the Recognition Act
402

The Second Circuit reversed and dismissed the injunction. The court
nowhere addressed the findings of systemic inadequacy or fraud except in the
occasional footnote; rather, it held that “[j]udgment-debtors can challenge a
foreign judgment’s validity under the Recognition Act only defensively, in
403
response to an attempted enforcement.” The court wrote:
Whatever the merits of Chevron’s complaints about the Ecuadorian courts,
however, the procedural device it has chosen to present those claims is simply
unavailable: The Recognition Act nowhere authorizes a court to declare a foreign
judgment unenforceable on the preemptive suit of a putative judgment-debtor.
The structure of the Act is clear. The sections on which Chevron relies provide
exceptions from the circumstances in which a holder of a foreign judgment can
obtain enforcement of that judgment in New York; they do not create an
affirmative cause of action to declare foreign judgments void and enjoin their
404
enforcement.
The court cited cases applying New York and other states’ recognition acts
and noted that nearly every one of them addressed the systemic inadequacy and
405
fraud grounds only when raised by judgment-debtors as affirmative defenses.
Its own research revealed only one case in which a judgment-debtor was allowed
406
to use the Recognition Act preemptively: Shell Oil Co. v. Franco. In that case,
Shell sought a declaratory judgment that a Nicaraguan DBCP judgment against it
407
was unenforceable. During the proceedings in Nicaragua, plaintiffs mistakenly
sued the distinct entity the Shell Chemical Company instead of the Shell Oil
Company. The district court for the Central District of California granted the
injunction on the ground that the Nicaraguan court lacked personal jurisdiction

and they were also subject to New York jurisdiction because of the connections of their agent, Donziger,
himself a New York attorney. Id. at 639–44. He also balanced the factors of fair play and substantial justice and
found that jurisdiction over the plaintiffs and their attorneys was reasonable. Id. at 644–45. The court also
rejected a number of other arguments raised by plaintiffs and their counsel, such as whether an injunction under
the Declaratory Judgment Act is allowed. Id. at 637–38.
402. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 240.
405. Id. at 240, 240 n.12 (citing Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D.Fla. 2009)
(Nicaragua); Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2006) (Congo); Soc’y of Loyd’s
v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000) (England); Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Liberia); S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enters, Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(Romania); Bank Melli v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406 (58 F.3d 1406) (9th Cir. 1995) (Iran); Ackermann v. Levine,
788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986) (West Germany)).
406. Id. at 240 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47557, 2005 WL 6184247 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 10, 2005)).
407. Id.
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408

over Shell Oil. The Second Circuit distinguished Franco because the
Nicaraguan plaintiffs had already and unsuccessfully sought enforcement in
California, while the Lago Agrio plaintiffs had not sought enforcement
409
anywhere.
The Second Circuit then went on to hold that it declined to follow Franco to
the extent that it supports the proposition that the Recognition Act can be used
410
preemptively. “Challenges to the validity of foreign judgments under the
Recognition Act can occur only after a bona fide judgment-creditor seeks
enforcement in an ‘action on the judgment, a motion for summary judgment in
lieu of complaint, or in a pending action by counterclaim, cross-claim or
411
affirmative defense,’ and not before.” To allow otherwise would contravene the
policy behind the Recognition Act and the common law principles behind it,
412
which are to provide for the “generous” enforcement of foreign judgments. The
court concluded that there was “no legal basis for the injunction that Chevron
seeks, and, on these facts, there will be no such basis until judgment-creditors
affirmatively seek to enforce their judgment in a court governed by New York or
413
similar law.”
The court rejected other reasons for upholding the preemptive use of New
414
York’s Recognition Act. The parties had argued over whether considerations of
415
international comity weighed in favor of or against the injunction. Because the
availability of an anti-enforcement injunction was governed by the Recognition
Act, which the court had held does not allow for such injunctions, the Second
Circuit found that “the injunction collapses before we reach issues of
416
international comity.” Another reason was that the DJA is “procedural only”
and does not provide a court discretion to declare rights that do not exist under
417
the law. Because the Recognition Act could not provide a legal predicate, the
418
DJA did not provide authority for issuing the injunction. The court found few
cases where the DJA and the Recognition Act were used together, and “none in
which a court undertook to use the DJA to declare the unenforceability of a
419
foreign judgment before the putative judgment-creditor could seek it.” The
Second Circuit found that the better approach was for Chevron to present its

408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Id.; Franco, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47557 at *2.
Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 240.
Id. at 241.
Id. (quoting N.Y. C.L.P.R. § 5303).
Id. (citing Galliano, S.A. v. Stallion, Inc., 15 N.Y.3d 75, 80 (2010)).
Id. at 242.
See id. at 243.
Id. (citing Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 646–48).
Id. at 244.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 244–45.
Id. at 245.
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defense to recognition and enforcement if and when the Lago Agrio plaintiffs
420
seek enforcement in New York. The case was remanded, and, except for the
421
DJA claim, Chevron’s suit continues as of the writing of this Article.
4. Rhetorical Analysis: Avoidance and Obfuscation
The appellate opinion directs the attention toward its preferred outcome: with
no authority to support preemptive nonrecognition, the policy of the Recognition
Act mandates only a defensive use. The rhetorical critic recognizes that, in
directing the attention toward this result, the Second Circuit also deflects
attention away from other possibilities by ignoring authority that has recognized
the potential for preemptive nonrecognition—which in several cases has been
422
granted. If a statutory provision has been interpreted one way by courts in the
system, then it needs to be interpreted the same way by other courts in that
423
system. A number of federal courts have allowed preemptive nonrecognition
based on readings of similar Recognition Acts, even saying that the state’s
424
Recognition Act does not apply to certain judgments. For the Second Circuit’s
interpretation to be valid, it needs to demonstrate that its result is consistent with
425
these opinions rather than ignore them. Instead, it distinguishes only one case
through a misreading, Franco, before turning to a construction of the New York
426
Recognition Act based on policy rather than statutory text. Rather than engage
the controlling law itself—which would reveal a result contrary to its holding—
427
the court avoids it. By avoiding relevant precedent and obfuscating the
statutory text, the court calls the integrity and legitimacy of this opinion’s
428
adherence to the rule of law into doubt.
The Second Circuit characterizes Chevron’s action for preemptive
429
nonrecognition as something so novel that there is little authority on point. As
discussed above, however, at least two commentators have addressed preemptive
nonrecognition. One devoted an entire section to this issue, stating that it was
merely “not clear whether the scope of the Recognition Act is specifically
limited to claims of enforcement and recognition or if it also includes the

420. Id. at 246 (citing Basic v. Fitzroy Eng’g, Ltd., 949 F. Supp. 1333, 1341 (N.D. Ill. 1996)).
421. See Steven Mufson, How Patton Boggs Got Mired in an Epic Legal Battle with Chevron over Jungle
Oil Pits, WASHINGTON POST (June 29, 2013) (profiling how the district court has allowed Chevron discovery
into the allegedly improper acts of another of plaintiffs’ attorneys, the Patton Boggs firm).
422. See supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text.
425. See id.
426. See supra notes 394–97 and accompanying text.
427. Id.
428. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text.
429. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
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declaratory judgment proceedings that seek to render a [foreign money judgment]
430
unenforceable.” After all, the Recognition Acts themselves say nothing about
431
declaratory judgments. The other commentator questioned whether Yahoo!’s
attempt at preemptive nonrecognition was “the vanguard of a new trend or an
432
exceptional kamikaze mission.” The answer is something in between, with at
least seven instances—eight if you include Chevron—since 1995 in which
judgment creditors sought to preempt enforcement of the foreign judgment
433
against them, and prevailed in a few of those cases.
The Second Circuit claimed that “research has discovered only one out-ofcircuit district court case that has allowed a judgment-debtor to use the
434
Recognition Act to make such a preemptive declaration,” which was Franco.
Unless the court used ridiculously precise and restrictive search terms, there is no
explanation for failing to uncover a case like Investorshub.com, where the district
court granted an injunction against US enforcement in a DJA suit brought by the
435
judgment debtor. Not much research is needed to find Matusevitch—which is
featured in at least two transnational litigation casebooks and is cited in eightythree law review articles—in which the district court refused recognition to a
436
foreign judgment based on a suit brought by the judgment debtor. The Second
Circuit could have drawn noteworthy distinctions between those cases and the
instant one, such as the stipulation to nonrecognition in the U.S. in Investorshub
or the earlier procedurally improper attempt by the judgment debtor in
Matusevitch to enforce, or that neither opinion addressed specifically whether
437
preemptive nonrecognition was allowed under the state’s Recognition Act.
Because the court did not discuss or even locate those cases—which this author
found in a half-hour of playing with different search term combinations on
438
Lexis —it creates the impression that Chevron’s claim was not given due
consideration.
The court put another unnecessary limitation on the cases it considered: only
those where the injunction was granted. In cases like Ehrenfeld and Drake, the
claimants’ lack of success had nothing to do with the inapplicability of the

430. Luthin, supra note 2, at 134 (emphasis added).
431. Id.
432. Gul, supra note 5, at 97.
433. Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006); Investorshub.com,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87566; Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23423 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26,
2006); Franco, 2005 WL 6184247 at *2; Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995); Drake v.
Brady, 2009 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1049 at *1–2 (Sept. 15, 2009).
434. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 240.
435. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87566.
436. 877 F. Supp. 1, 2; BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 1136–38; THOMAS E. CHARBONNEAU,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 327–31 (2005).
437. See supra notes 131–33, 418–19 and accompanying text.
438. Investorshub, Yahoo!, Matusevitch, and Drake were found with searches like [nonrecogni! /s
procedure and foreign / s money /s judgment] and [foreign / s money /s judgment /p declaratory /s judgment].
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Recognition Act but related to other reasons like lack of personal jurisdiction
over the judgment creditor or the debtor’s failure to cite authority supporting the
439
grounds for nonrecognition. Yahoo! is particularly instructive because three of
the eleven judges held that the California Recognition Act did not even apply,
and an additional five judges implicitly agreed because they would have allowed
the district court to enter an injunction in favor of the plaintiff/judgment
440
creditor. Again, Yahoo! is distinguishable because the Act did not apply since
441
the French judgment was an injunction rather than a money judgment. But the
rationale is one that provides guidance: some judgments may not fall within the
scope of the Recognition Act, thus allowing judgment creditors in a DJA action
442
to secure an injunction based on considerations of comity.
While courts wish to avoid ambiguity, it arises at strategic spots, so courts
must sometimes distinguish contrary authority. Thus, the Second Circuit cannot
avoid factually and procedurally similar Franco, where a multinational
corporation sought a preliminary injunction under the DJA against Latin
443
American judgment creditors, but the Second Circuit’s cramped reading of that
opinion suggests that there is no substantive difference between that case and
this. The court wrote that the district court in that case granted the injunction
after “deeming the plaintiffs’ first failed attempt at enforcement sufficient to
444
trigger the nonrecognition exceptions of California’s Recognition Act.” The
first failed attempt at nonrecognition was but one factor the Franco court
445
446
considered. It noted the size of the judgment was “in excess of $480 million.”
It also pointed out that the judgment creditors had not explained why they would
not seek a second attempt at enforcement, “nor have they disclaimed an intent to
447
seek enforcement against Shell Oil.” The Lago Agrio plaintiffs likewise have a
large judgment (ten times the half-billion-dollar award in Franco); they have
refused to stipulate that they will not seek enforcement during the pendency of
the proceedings in New York; and the evidence before Judge Kaplan shows that
448
they do plan to seek immediate enforcement—just not in New York. Making
449
distinctions on frivolous differences suggests a lack of impartiality.

439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
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See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47557 at *6–13.
667 F.3d at 240 (citing Franco, 2005 WL 6184247 at *4).
2005 WL 6184247 at *4.
Id.
2005 WL 6184247 at *4.
See supra Part IV.B.
MacCormick, supra note 15, at 143.
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MacCormick writes that justice requires that cases should be decided like
450
previous cases that are relevant; indeed, cases that differ in their relevant facts
451
need not be cited because they are not even precedent. Rather than address the
preemptive nonrecognition opinions (except for Franco), the Second Circuit
cited several others to support its assertion that the proper procedure is for a
judgment creditor to seek enforcement first and then for the judgment debtor to
452
challenge it by affirmative defense. While it is true that the parties in those
cases happened to follow that procedure, none of those opinions addressed
whether or not the given state’s Recognition Act mandated it. All the Second
Circuit did was note the typical process for enforcing foreign money judgments;
453
that does not mean it is the only way that the Recognition Act applies. Indeed,
the Recognition Act comes into play in other procedural contexts, such as when
the judgment creditor is sued and seeks recognition of the foreign money
454
judgment for collateral estoppel or res judicata purposes. These opinions where
the Recognition Act was raised in a typical proceeding are therefore irrelevant to
455
the issue.
Another problem was how the court approached interpretation of the
Recognition Act itself. In other cases where the party challenges not just the
application to the evidence but the interpretation of the Recognition Act, the
judges quote entire portions of the statute and engage in a lengthy analysis of the
456
specific terms. The Second Circuit instead leads and closes with the policy of
the New York Recognition Act: because it was meant to ensure that New York
fora remain “generous” for foreign judgments, the grounds for nonrecognition
457
can be raised defensively only, so the approach in Franco is not permitted. Yet
policy should bolster rather than substitute for a reading of the statutory text
450. See id.; supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text..
451. Todd, supra note 20, at 75.
452. 667 F.3d at 240 n.12.
453. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1213 (“In a typical enforcement case, the party in whose favor the foreign
judgment was granted comes to an American court affirmatively seeking enforcement. . . . However, this is not
the typical case, for the successful plaintiffs in the French court do not seek enforcement. Rather, Yahoo!, the
unsuccessful defendant in France, seeks a declaratory judgment that the French court’ interim orders are
unenforceable anywhere in this country.”).
454. See, e.g., Southwest Livestock and Trucking Co., Inc. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 318–20 (5th Cir.
1999) (reversing trial court’s determination that Mexican judgment was not entitled to recognition as defense
against judgment debtors’ action against lender for violation of Texas usury laws and RICO); RESTATEMENT
(3D) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. b.
455. That it relied on this and other merely persuasive authority to support its conclusions counters any
argument that the court was not bound to cite authority from outside the Second Circuit and New York State,
because then ignoring contrary but relevant extrajudicial authority only magnifies the perception of bias. See
Aldisert, supra note 18, at 632–33 (distinguishing precedent from persuasive authority).
456. See, e.g., Soc’y of Lloyds, 233 F.3d at 481–82 (interpreting the Illinois Recognition Act as allowing a
single procedure for recognizing and enforcing a foreign money judgment); Southwest Livestock and Trucking
Co., Inc., 169 F.3d at 320–23, 320 n.2 (quoting the grounds for nonrecognition and then explicating the
meaning of “cause of action” in the public policy ground).
457. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239, 241.
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itself. As MacCormick writes, judges often allude to justice or public policy as a
458
criterion of evaluation. Such an appeal “seems conclusory rather than
argumentative. It states the result of an evaluation without showing the working
459
of it.” Professor Little characterized such abdication to higher authority, that
460
the result is mandated by the state, as an avoidance strategy.
When applying a statute, the courts must interpret its terms, and reasons
461
should be given for preferred interpretations that are decisive. The Second
Circuit quotes only two of three relevant sections of the Act, and then only parts
462
of them. It leads with Section 5302: “The Recognition Act supports the
enforcement of foreign judgments that are ‘final, conclusive and enforceable
where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to
463
appeal.’” It then skips Section 5303, the provision dealing with recognition and
464
enforcement, and moves to Section 5304, the grounds for nonrecognition.
Rather than quote that section, it characterizes those grounds as “exceptions”—
thus suggesting they are appropriate only in response to the judgment creditor
465
first seeking recognition—and then quotes only portions of Section 5304. The
court then returns to a partial quote of Section 5303 to support the policy
argument that challenges to the validity of the judgment can be brought only after
466
recognition.
It would be nitpicky to criticize the Second Circuit for not following to the
letter the judicial canons of statutory construction. But in ignoring even the most
basic rules about interpreting statutes, the court creates a perception that its
conclusions are not based in law. Three canons are particularly relevant. First,
courts cannot read anything out of a statute but must instead give “significance
467
and effect . . . to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act.” Second,
“identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the
468
same meaning.” Finally, “courts should, if reasonably possible to do so,

458. MacCormick, supra note 15, at 112.
459. Id.
460. Little, supra note 90, at 102–03.
461. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
462. See Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239–41.
463. Id. at 239.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 239–40.
466. Id. at 241.
467. 73 AM. JUR. (2D) STATUTES § 111 (“Courts, generally, in the interpretation of a statute, may not
take, strike, or read anything out of a statute, or delete, subtract, or omit anything therefrom. To the contrary, it
is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect should, if possible, be accorded to every
word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act.”); see id. at 107 (“In interpreting a statute, the court can neither insert
language that has been left out nor omit language that has been inserted.”).
468. Id. § 140.
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interpret the statute or the provision being construed so as to give it efficient
469
operation and effect as a whole.”
Applying just these three, we see that the persuasiveness of the court’s
reasoning from policy grounds lacks authority. In quoting Section 5302, the
Second Circuit ignored the italicized portion: “This article applies to any foreign
country judgment which is final, conclusive and enforceable where rendered even
470
though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal.” Rather than
471
“support[ing] the enforcement of foreign judgments,” the provision actually
narrows the scope of the Recognition Act only to certain foreign judgments: ones
472
that are “final, conclusive, and enforceable.” The enforceability of judgments is
not addressed until Section 5303, most of which the Second Circuit ignores:
Except as provided in section 5304, a foreign country judgment meeting
the requirements of section 5302 is conclusive between the parties to the
extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. Such a foreign
judgment is enforceable by an action on the judgment, a motion for
summary judgment in lieu of complaint, or in a pending action by
473
counterclaim, cross-claim or affirmative defense.
Thus, only “conclusive” judgments are enforceable, and Section 5304 may
474
affect whether a judgment is conclusive. The first mandatory ground, systemic
inadequacy, is addressed in Section 5304(a): “No recognition. A foreign country
judgment is not conclusive if (1) the judgment was rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
475
requirements of due process of law.” This section therefore specifies which
476
foreign judgments are not conclusive under the Act.
A reading based on the full text of the relevant statutes results in an
interpretation that could support Judge Kaplan. Because a judgment rendered
under a system that does not provide impartial tribunals is not conclusive under
Section 5304, it is not entitled to enforcement under Section 5303, and therefore
477
the Recognition Act does not apply to it under Section 5302. To determine
whether to grant the injunction, Judge Kaplan had to determine whether the Lago
Agrio plaintiffs’ judgment was enforceable under the Recognition Act. Having
determined that it was not conclusive and therefore not enforceable, the

469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.

Id. § 155.
N.Y. CLS CPLR § 5302 (emphasis added); Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239.).
See Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239.
N.Y. CLS CPLR § 5302.
N.Y. CLS CPLR § 5303 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. § 5304(a) (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra notes 454–460 and accompanying text.
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Recognition Act did not apply, so he could rely upon principles of comity and the
478
DJA to enter the anti-enforcement injunction. Referring to the policy of the
New York Recognition Act as articulated by the courts of New York is certainly
proper—and with a more detailed analysis might override this construction—but
avoiding the text of the statute itself and the relevant case law calls into question
479
the integrity and legitimacy of the opinion.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE RHETORIC OF (NON)RECOGNITION
Scholars have decried the systemic inadequacy ground, particularly as
applied to these two cases, yet that ground had no adverse effect on the judgment
creditors. But this rhetorical analysis has revealed that the ground did affect the
reasoning of the appellate courts and had a negative impact on the rule of law and
on the parties themselves.
With such high-profile cases, both courts could have engaged in a thorough
analysis of all the sources it considered conflicting and offered definitive judicial
statements. The Eleventh Circuit in particular could have based its rejection of
the systemic inadequacy finding on a Constitutional ground, the act of state
doctrine, which has been articulated by the Supreme Court and proffered by
scholars. Or the Eleventh Circuit might have advanced a new interpretation of the
systemic inadequacy ground or the type and amount of evidence needed to prove
it. In Camacho Naranjo, the Second Circuit might have cited and distinguished
all the other cases on preemptive nonrecognition and then engaged in a thorough
reading of the Recognition Act.
The reason why neither court took bold action is likely because these cases
480
are so high-profile, and courts prefer to avoid controversy. Jonathan C.
Drimmer and Sarah R. Lamoree have detailed the political action taken by the
parties in both the DBCP and Lago Agrio litigation, which includes the
481
involvement of the governments of Nicaragua and Ecuador. Each country
enacted legislation specifically in aid of the plaintiffs, and President Correa has
come out publicly in support of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs and of enforcing the
482
judgment. Indeed, the government of Ecuador stands to gain the most from
successful enforcement, which provides billions in soil and water remediation yet
483
imposes no liability for the actions of the state-owned Petroecuador. While the
Eleventh Circuit said nothing, the Second Circuit seemed well aware of the
478. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d, § II; see also Luthin, supra note 2, at 134 (“The Recognition Act. . .
define[s] the defines scope n terms of the [foreign money judgment] itself. . . .[I]f the [foreign money judgment]
c omports with the requirements of the Act, then it is covered by the Act.”).
479. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
480. See supra Part IV.
481. See Drimmer, supra note 11, at 489–512.
482. Id.
483. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 353; Patel, supra note 10, at 103.
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implications for international relations of labeling another’s country’s judiciary
484
as impartial and corrupt. For example, it opined that allowing preemptive
nonrecognition “would unquestionably provoke extensive friction between legal
systems by encouraging challenges to the legitimacy of foreign courts in cases in
which the enforceability of the foreign judgment might otherwise never be
485
presented in New York.” It also wrote that comity cautioned against using a
court of New York “as a transnational arbiter to dictate to the entire world which
judgments are entitled to respect and which countries’ courts are to be treated as
486
international pariahs.” The court did not apply the systemic inadequacy ground
because it clearly wished to avoid doing so, and its holding therefore has
everything to do with the ground.
But in deferring to the governments of foreign countries, these two courts
ignored other stakeholders in the drama, such as the states that have enacted
recognition laws and US courts that have interpreted them. To support its
reversal of the district court’s finding, the Eleventh Circuit would have had to
distinguish or decline to adopt the approach in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits. To do so ignores that Florida courts have characterized the Recognition
Acts of other states as substantially the same as Florida’s and therefore relied
upon extrajurisdictional authority. While rhetoricians acknowledge such
ambiguity, that other courts can and have come out differently, judges avoid it
because they want the appearance of the right and inevitable result. Or, the court
would have had to inject the US Constitution into this issue of state law, thus
inviting Supreme Court review. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit avoided politics
altogether through the distancing device of a per curiam opinion devoid of
reference to any authority on scope of review or the soundness of the district
487
court’s approach.
The Second Circuit likewise would have had to acknowledge that it stands
alone in holding that the Recognition Act forbids preemptive nonrecognition if it
had to distinguish the numerous state and federal court opinions, including the
488
Ninth Circuit, that seem to allow it, so it avoided those cases altogether. In light
of the controversy of this political topic, the court chose not to engage but instead
489
obfuscated, clinging to vague policy rather than detailed statutory construction.
It abdicated to the higher authority of the New York Recognition Act without
explicating that Act, which by its terms does not compel employing the grounds
490
for nonrecognition only in defense.

484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

See Camacho Naranjo, 667 F. 3d at 246.
Id.
Id. at 242.
See generally Osorio, 635 F.3d 1277.
See generally Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232.
Id.
Id. at 253–255.
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These opinions also create irrational and inconsistent authority, whether
precedential or persuasive, for future litigation. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the
systemic inadequacy ground and the result was still the same: no recognition and
491
enforcement. Accordingly, the holding did not change the result for these
parties, but what about future litigants? “A reviewing court abdicates its role in
providing future guidance where it affirms a trial court decision without
492
disclosing its rationale for doing so.” We cannot assume that all cases arising
from Nicaragua will be based on “legislation that de facto guarantees the denial
of due process” and that deprives the trial court of personal and subject matter
493
jurisdiction. For a point of law that is seldom applied, Judge Huck’s opinion
could have had tremendous value as precedent for judgment debtors, or even as
persuasive authority since most states have adopted either the 1962 or 2005
494
Recognition Acts, both of which have the systemic inadequacy ground. Now,
judgment debtors cannot cite to a thorough and well-reasoned opinion. And the
opinion reaches beyond Nicaraguan judgments: judgment creditors from every
nation now have authority to challenge any trial court that follows the same
approach to systemic inadequacy as Judge Huck, even though it is the approach
that other courts have followed. Because the Eleventh Circuit did not specify the
error, both the interpretation of systemic inadequacy and the types and amount of
evidence to prove it are called into question.
The opinion also creates a problem for judgment creditors, however. Those
from Nicaragua might request a US court to take judicial notice of the rejection
of Judge Huck’s finding of systemic inadequacy to support the proposition that
Nicaragua in fact has impartial tribunals. But the Eleventh Circuit did not
substitute its own findings of fact, so there is nothing of which to take judicial
495
notice. Further, because the court described no rules of law that controlled its
rejection of the systemic inadequacy finding, the opinion contains no specific
doctrine and therefore should have zero value as binding or even persuasive
496
authority. Nor does the court’s statement satisfy the definition of dictum
because it does not concern a rule of law or legal proposition, and it was essential
497
to the determination of the case. With so little judicial authority on this ground,
judgment creditors will likely cite it anyway, thus adding another conflicting
voice to the patchwork of opinions on state recognition laws. Because this
ground is still the law, judgment creditors from other developing nations also

491. See Osorio, 635 F.3d 1277 at 1278–79.
492. 5 AM. JUR. 2D APPELLATE REVIEW § 773.
493. Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 10–11.
494. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
495. See generally Osorio, 635 F.3d 1277
496. Id.; Todd, supra note 20, at 78–79; Maltz, supra note 74, at 366–83.
497. Todd, supra note 20, at 79 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990) (defining dictum
as “[s]tatements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not . . . essential
to determination of the case.”).
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face uncertainty, especially if they attempt to enforce in Florida or any state in
the Eleventh Circuit, because they do not know, nor do they have a reasoned way
498
of knowing, what the specific error was.
Because of its desire to avoid passing judgment on the Ecuadoran judiciary,
the opinion in Camacho Naranjo likewise confuses future enforcement
proceedings in the U.S. It deprives judgment debtors of the possibility of
preemptive nonrecognition in the Second Circuit, and, as the only opinion that
has squarely addressed the issue, potentially in other jurisdictions as well. Some
state and federal courts have been receptive to preemptive nonrecognition,
499
however. To the extent they can obtain personal jurisdiction outside the Second
Circuit, judgment debtors will go elsewhere and challenge Camacho Naranjo
when it is inevitably raised by the judgment creditors. Because that case did little
to distinguish seemingly contrary authority, and because its interpretation of the
New York Recognition Act is based on policy rather than its specific terms,
500
judgment creditors might win this challenge. This could result in a circuit split,
but on an issue of multiple states’ laws that the Supreme Court may be unwilling
501
to review.
Perhaps the most glaring defect in both opinions is that it denies the rule of
502
law to the parties themselves. Win or lose, each party comes to the court with
the expectation that the decisions on their contested points will accord with the
relevant legal authority and that they will be treated consistently with other
persons who have litigated similar claims. While the outcome in Osorio would
not change because of the other grounds for nonrecognition, the parties
nevertheless contested one statutory ground that they developed through
considerable evidence on both sides, for which they received a detailed
conclusion from the district court, but which the Eleventh Circuit casually tossed
503
aside. By declining to offer even a hint as to why, the court showed a lack of
respect. Further, it diminished the legitimacy of the outcome: if no reason need
be given to find a ground unsupportable, then are the reasons for the other
grounds supportable? The parties can rightly wonder whether the judge in recreating the law afforded them justice when it refused to give them justifications.
504
This same question arises with the parties in Camacho Naranjo. While the
Second Circuit at least adopted specific doctrine and offered a rationale for its

498. See MacCormick, supra note 15, at 12, 16.
499. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text.
500. See generally Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232.
501. See United States v. S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 816 n.12 (1984)
(“[W]e generally accord great deference to the interpretation and application of state law by the Courts of
Appeals.”).
502. See generally Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232; Osorio, 635 F.3d 1277.
503. See generally Osorio, 635 F.3d 1277.
504. 667 F.3d 232.
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holding, neither the doctrine nor rationale was reasonable because the court
ignored or misread relevant authority and declined to examine the controlling
authority of the New York Recognition Act. Unlike the parties in Osorio, though,
the Second Circuit’s opinion had a practical effect on the parties: with the
preliminary injunction against worldwide enforcement dismissed, the Lago Agrio
506
plaintiffs have initiated their “Invictus” plan. They have already gone to the
courts of several nations such as Canada, Brazil, Columbia, and Argentina, thus
507
forcing Chevron to defend multiple enforcement actions rather than one. An
Argentine trial court ordered approximately $2 billion of assets of a Chevron
508
subsidiary frozen, thus disrupting Chevron’s worldwide operations. If the
Second Circuit had identified and distinguished the other cases where preemptive
nonrecognition was allowed and engaged in a more thorough analysis of the New
York Recognition Act, then its opinion, though arguable, would be reasonable.
Even though Chevron would never like this outcome, the court would have
demonstrated that it had at least considered Chevron’s stance before reversing the
injunction. Instead, Chevron can perceive that its adherence was not secured
through reason, so the foreign enforcement proceedings and asset seizures are the
result of a denial of justice by the courts of its own country.
Judge Posner has written, “We should not be so naïve as to infer the nature of
509
the judicial process from the rhetoric of judicial opinions.” Yet we can examine
the rhetoric of judicial opinions for their impact on the integrity of the judicial
process when well-reasoned trial court opinions are disregarded without sound
basis—or any basis at all.

505. See Maltz, supra note 74, at 376–83.
506. Emily Schmall, Argentina: Chevron’s Assets Are Frozen, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/11/08/world/americas/argentina-chevrons-assets-are-frozen.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 27,
2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
507. Id.
508. Id.; Pablo Gonzalez, Ecuador to Sue Chevron in Argentina to Enforce Judgment, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-31/ecuador-to-sue-chevron-inargentina-to-enforce-judgment (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
509. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 865 (1988).
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